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Regrettably Unfair: Brooke Astor 
and the Other Elderly in  
New York 
 
Joseph A. Rosenberg* 
 
All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy 
in its own way.1 
 
The “great recession of 2008”2 has widened the already 
large economic gap that exists between those that inhabit the 
various parts of the two New Yorks: the haves and the have-
nots, the wealthy and the poor, those with enough money to 
support themselves and those struggling to make ends meet.  
The stress of these economic hard times appears related to a 
record number of cases filed in New York courts,3 and the 
abuse and financial exploitation of elders by family members 
who have fallen on hard times is part of the dismal picture.  In 
her book,4 Meryl Gordon chronicles the rise and fall of Brooke 
Astor, an icon of wealth, class, and philanthropy in New York 
City, and provides a window through which we see how “power 
 
*  Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law.  Thank you to my colleague, 
Ruthann Robson, for lending a caring and insightful ear that helped crystall-
ize the idea for this article.  My interest in using this book as a foundation for 
an article was sparked by the author, Meryl Gordon, during a conversation 
we had at the Brookdale Center on Aging Chinese New Year dinner in 2009. 
1. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volok-
honsky trans., Penguin Books 2000) (1877). 
2. See Posting of Catherine Rampell to Economixblog, „Great Recession‟: 
A Brief Etymology (Mar. 11, 2009, 17:39 EST), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-
etymology. 
3. See William Glaberson, The Recession Begins Flooding Into the 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at A1.  The connection between a rise in 
elder abuse in New York and the economic recession was recently noted by 
Judge Fern Fisher, Deputy Administrative Judge of the City of New York, in 
her introductory remarks at the First Department Roundtable on Article 81 
Guardianships at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on No-
vember 12, 2009. 
4. MERYL GORDON, MRS. ASTOR REGRETS: THE HIDDEN BETRAYALS OF A 
FAMILY BEYOND REPROACH (2008). 
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and greed and corruptible seed”5 converged to destroy the rari-
fied Astors.  “Small family, big problems,”6 observed Philip 
Marshall, Mrs. Astor‟s grandson and a central protagonist in 
this sad story.  Although the magnitude of the Astor family im-
plosion owes much to the extreme wealth of the family, the 
depth of the family‟s dysfunction is also rooted in destructive 
relationships that sowed the seeds of the problems that became 
so acute during the last years of Brooke Astor‟s life.  This com-
bustible combination, fueled by all the lawyers money could 
buy, exploded into public view in 2006 with Philip‟s petition to 
appoint a guardian7 for his grandmother when she was 104 
years old.  After her death, a criminal trial that lasted five 
months concluded with multiple convictions against her only 
child, Anthony Marshall, and one of her lawyers, Francis X. 
Morrissey, on charges that included scheme to defraud, grand 
larceny, offering false instruments for filing, forgery, posses-
sion of stolen property, and conspiracy.  Mr. Marshall received 
a sentence of one to three years for his conviction on the first 
degree larceny charge, which he received for giving himself a 
retroactive raise of $1 million for managing his mother‟s fin-
ances, and a concurrent sentence of one year on each of the 
other thirteen counts on which he was convicted.8  The sen-
tence for first degree larceny was mandatory, and the one-year 
sentences he received on each of the other counts are to run 
concurrently.9  Mr. Morrissey was also given concurrent sen-
tences of one to three years for his convictions on the charges of 
scheming to defraud and grand larceny.10  Still to come, absent 
a settlement, is a probate proceeding in Surrogate‟s Court to 
determine the validity of Mrs. Astor‟s 2002 will and three sub-
sequent codicils and the resolution of the appeals filed by Mar-
 
5. BOB DYLAN, Blind Willie McTell, on 1-3 THE BOOTLEG SERIES (Colum-
bia Records 1991). 
6. GORDON, supra note 4, at 276. 
7. The guardianship proceeding was brought under Article 81 of the 
Mental Hygiene Law. 
8. James Barron, Brooke Astor’s Son is Sentenced to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 22, 2009, at A31. 
9. Id. 
10. Id.  Morrissey was automatically disbarred as a result of his felony 
convictions pursuant to N.Y. Judiciary Law Section 904(b) and (3), and his 
name was removed from the roll of attorneys effective October 9, 2009, the 
date he was convicted.  In re Morrissey, No. M4807, slip op. 1443, 1443 (N.Y. 
App. Div. Feb. 18, 2010). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/7
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shall and Morrissey.11 
Meryl Gordon‟s portrait of the fabulously wealthy and 
proper Mrs. Astor‟s decline and exploitation during her final 
years is part of a larger story of a woman who experienced 
abuse and hardship in two of her three marriages, had a dis-
tant and dysfunctional relationship with her only child, and 
inherited extraordinary riches that she bestowed generously on 
many charitable organizations, most of which were located in 
her beloved New York City.  Implicit in the story are broader 
socio-economic and cultural issues of our time.  These issues 
include the influence of marriage on the plight and exploitation 
of women, the stark disparities in wealth in the United States, 
the combustible brew of long-term family dysfunction and 
greed, and the vulnerability of the frail elderly to neglect and 
abuse.12 
This article juxtaposes the damning and cautionary tale of 
the Astor/Marshall family within the broader context of the 
plight of vulnerable elders whose lives, in stark contrast to 
Brooke Astor, are shaped in large part by poverty, powerless-
ness, and injustice.  In the criminal trial, Mrs. Astor‟s geriatri-
cian, Dr. Howard M. Fillit, testified that her wealth slowed the 
progression of her incapacity and that she maintained a higher 
degree of functionality than the average person, by virtue of 
her ability to afford to pay for a large staff that provided the 
highest quality of care.13  This logical, and perhaps obvious, ob-
servation nonetheless reflects a stark and disturbing reality 
with significant implications for vulnerable elders—
 
11. Surrogate‟s Court is the primary court in New York with jurisdiction 
over wills and estates.  N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 201 (McKinney 1998).  
Both men are free on bail pending the outcome of their respective appeals.  
See John Eligon, Astor’s Son to Stay Free During Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 
2010, at A16. 
12. The World Health Organization recognizes that 65 is the generally 
accepted benchmark, but recommends 50 as the definition of an elderly per-
son in developing nations, specifically in sub-Sahara Africa.  World Health 
Organization, Definition of an Older or Elderly Person, 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/survey/ageingdefnolder/en/index.html (last vi-
sited Mar. 24, 2010).  The United Nations uses 60 or 65 to define old age.  Ac-
cording to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2006, 35.5 million people in the United 
States, or about 12% of the population, were 65 or older.  U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, POPULATION BY AGE, SEX, RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2006 (2007), 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/age/2006older_table1.1.xls. 
13. John Eligon, Witness Says Astor’s Staff Helped Mask Her Decline, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at A25. 
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particularly for the “unbefriended”14 elderly, who are those 
without family or friends, those who lack access to, or depend 
upon public funding of, resources that are supposed to provide 
the care and services that were so beneficial to Brooke Astor. 
The allegations that first surfaced in the guardianship pe-
tition were quite serious.  Some of these allegations formed the 
basis for the criminal indictments of Marshall and Morrissey.  
For a period of time, the level of care Mrs. Astor received was 
below the standard to which she was accustomed.  Her son 
made decisions that isolated her from longtime caretakers and 
exiled her from her residence at Holly Hill in Westchester 
County.  At all times, however, the extent of Mrs. Astor‟s hard-
ship was relatively mild and substantially mitigated by her 
wealth.15  Without minimizing the difficulties she had to en-
 
14. See Naomi Karp & Erica Wood, Incapacitated and Alone: Health 
Care Decision Making for the Unbefriended Older People, HUM. RTS. MAG., 
Spring 2004, http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/spring04/incapacitated.html. 
15. For example, the guardianship petition alleged, inter alia, that Mrs. 
Astor was allowed to sleep on a couch that reeked of dog urine (an allegation 
never proved) because it was too cold to sleep in the bedroom of her Park 
Avenue apartment in the winter, her apartment was not kept clean, she was 
served packaged foods instead of freshly cooked meals expertly prepared with 
the most expensive ingredients, her staff was reduced, and medication was 
discontinued or replaced with inadequate substitutes (her doctor later stated 
that he discontinued the medication).  GORDON, supra note 4, at 193-95.  The 
alleged financial exploitation (most of which was later proved in the criminal 
case) included the theft of money and transfers of assets, which reduced Mrs. 
Astor‟s wealth from approximately $180 million to $120 million.  By any 
standard these material losses were substantial, perhaps staggering, even 
relative to Mrs. Astor‟s total wealth.  And the allegations of personal neglect 
may have caused mild hardship.  Yet the question of relativity in assessing 
the extent of damages is worth exploring.  In a different context, the issue of 
whether an appropriate standard of living should be assessed with a subjec-
tive or objective metric arose in cases that decided the appropriate standard 
of support to which a community spouse of a Medicaid recipient residing in a 
nursing home was entitled under the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 
1988, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d) (2006).  The New York Court of Appeals held 
that the enhanced, but lesser, Medicaid income and resource levels for the 
community spouse should govern, not the person‟s prior standard of living.  
Gomprecht v. Gomprecht, 652 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1995).  In Mrs. Astor‟s case, a 
subjective view would consider the problems in care and comfort and the loss 
of so much money and property within the context of her prior lifestyle.  An 
objective evaluation based on a reasonable standard of living would recognize 
the impact of the reduced level of care and the value of the property that was 
stolen or misappropriated, but the level of care and attention Mrs. Astor con-
tinued to receive and the extraordinary wealth that remained would be sig-
nificant mitigating factors in assessing the extent of her personal discomfort 
and material losses. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/7
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dure, they were mild compared to the severe consequences, de-
privation, and exploitation truly vulnerable elderly experience.  
The hardship inflicted on Brooke Astor was cushioned by the 
financial and social support she had available. 
Through the prism of Brooke Astor‟s story, this article ex-
amines developments in New York law that relate to the im-
pact of incapacity and exploitation on truly vulnerable elders.  
Unfortunately, most elders who have compelling and notewor-
thy stories of injustice lack the glamour of wealth and celebrity 
that draw us in, like bystanders stealing a glimpse of the 
wreckage of an automobile accident.  Part I of this article dis-
cusses Meryl Gordon‟s book, a story about wealth, class, and 
privilege, and the Astor family‟s epic dysfunction, the pheno-
menon of elder abuse, and the failures of the cadre of lawyers 
hired by Brooke Astor.  Notably, Astor‟s lawyers failed to ade-
quately serve her, but always presented her with excessive bills 
for their services.16  Part II explores the nature and extent of 
elder abuse, particularly financial exploitation, both nationally 
and in New York.  This section will focus on the abuse of pow-
ers of attorney and the exploitation of elders with diminished 
capacity to secure benefits under a will and estate plan.17  This 
section also covers the new power of attorney statute and the 
provisions designed to reduce the incidence of abuse by agents.  
Part III examines the remedies for elder abuse that were uti-
lized in the Astor case—guardianship, criminal charges, and a 
will contest—and examines how the Astor case implicates re-
cent developments in these areas.  Part IV analyzes the con-
duct of the attorneys who represented Mrs. Astor—the “men in 
suits” who failed Mrs. Astor and Susan I. Robbins, who was 
appointed by the court to represent Mrs. Astor in the guardian-
ship case and provided her with high quality representation—
within professional norms, best practices, and the provisions of 
the recently enacted New York Rules of Professional Conduct.  
This article concludes by reflecting on the relationship among 
economic class, the availability and quality of support services, 
 
16. In the guardianship case alone, which was settled without a trial, 
the judge reduced the total amount of fees requested by the various attorneys 
from $3 million to $2.2 million.  In re Marshall, 831 N.Y.S.2d 360, 360 (Sup. 
Ct. 2006); GORDON, supra note 4, at 232. 
17. A will includes all codicils that modify the will.  N.Y. EST. POWERS & 
TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.1 (McKinney 1998). 
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guardianship, and elder abuse. 
 
I. The Rise and Fall of Mrs. Astor and Her Family 
 
Meryl Gordon paints a picture of Brooke Astor that both 
repels and attracts, but captures the essence of a woman who 
transcended both her humble beginnings and aristocratic life-
style to make a mark on New York City that was unique and 
perhaps unparalleled.  The Chinese Courtyard at the Metropol-
itan Museum of Art, the New York Public Library, the Bronx 
Zoo, restored Harlem row houses, and low-income neighbor-
hoods in the South Bronx were beneficiaries of the Astor Foun-
dation‟s largesse under Mrs. Astor‟s stewardship.18  Through-
out the book, the matter-of-fact descriptions of Brooke Astor‟s 
homes, clothes, paintings, privilege, and social calendar 
breathe new meaning into the phrase “filthy rich.”  Yet the jux-
taposition of the long, grim, and sad history of the As-
tor/Marshall family dysfunction, the domestic violence Brooke 
Astor suffered at the hands of her first husband, the almost un-
imaginably generous, thoughtful, and transformative charita-
ble giving of the Astor Foundation, Brooke‟s genuine affection 
for people regardless of their station in life, her intellectual cu-
riosity and passion for life, and the neglect and exploitation she 
suffered that marred the last years of her life, prevent one from 
merely dismissing Brooke Astor as a wealthy dilettante.  Like a 
flower that struggles to meet the sun through garbage and de-
bris, Brooke Astor earned respect, empathy, and affection as 
she used her position and the Astor Foundation to improve the 
city she loved.  Mrs. Astor also endured the humiliation of neg-
lect and exploitation during the last years of her life, a period 
of steep physical and mental decline. 
The foibles, triumphs, tribulations, and downfall of the rich 
and famous have long fascinated the media and public.  Mrs. 
Astor Regrets begins just after Thanksgiving in 2007 with the 
arraignment of then eighty-three year old Anthony Marshall, 
Mrs. Astor‟s only child, on charges of “fraud, conspiracy, and 
theft” against his mother.19  The stunning image of this “epi-
 
18. GORDON, supra note 4, at 6. 
19. Id. at 4. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/7
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tome of WASP rectitude”20 in handcuffs fed the insatiable appe-
tite of the tabloids.21  The eighteen-count indictment included 
charges of grand larceny, falsifying business records, conspira-
cy, and possession of stolen property.22 
We quickly discover how the distant past formed the gene-
sis of the shocking downfall of the Astor/Marshall family and 
shaped the complex nature of the relationship between mother 
and son.  Not surprisingly, considering their extreme wealth, 
we also learn that the family was no stranger to bitter feuds 
about money.  Anthony Marshall had a childhood of privileged, 
benign neglect, including an early exile to boarding school.  As 
a young man who was a beneficiary of a trust fund, Mr. Mar-
shall had to fight in court against the unjustified claims of his 
biological father against the trust.23  Brooke Astor, following 
the sudden death of Vincent Astor, her third and final husband 
after just five and one-half years of marriage, successfully de-
fended a challenge to her inheritance by her husband‟s heirs.24  
Meryl Gordon skillfully weaves this background information to 
illustrate how the Astor family‟s past was indeed a prologue to 
future events.25 
Brooke Astor was raised in middle class circumstances—
comfortable, but by no means wealthy.  Her father was a mili-
tary man and her mother was determined to elevate Brooke‟s 
station in life through marriage.26  The impact of Mrs. Astor‟s 
three marriages on her life looms large.  Her mother arranged 
Brooke‟s first marriage at age 17 to John Dryden Kuser, the 
heir of a New Jersey fortune.27  This unhappy relationship was 
marred by severe physical abuse, and quickly ended in divorce, 
but not before it produced her only child Anthony.28  Mrs. Astor 
then married, the love of her life, Buddie Marshall, whose last 
 
20. Id. at 1. 
21. “„BAD BOY,‟ scolded the News.  „CROOK ASTOR,‟ snarled the Post.”  
Id. 
22. Id. 
23. GORDON, supra note 4, at 62. 
24. Id. at 76-77. 
25. “Whereof, what‟s past is prologue; what to come, In yours and my 
discharge . . . .”  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1. 
26. GORDON, supra note 4, at 7. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
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name was assumed by her son.29  Six months after Buddie died, 
Vincent Astor proposed to Brooke, having already included her 
in a new will as his “prospective” wife.  His death several years 
later left Mrs. Astor a widow at age 55 and the beneficiary of a 
$60 million trust fund and control over the Astor Foundation.30  
The societal pressure to marry, the upward economic mobility 
that marriage promised (and ultimately delivered to her), and 
the scars of domestic violence would prove to be major forces 
that shaped the life of Brooke Astor. 
Brooke Astor was a complex mix of contradictions.  She 
had an incessant need for attention, could not stand to be 
bored, had a large ego, and embraced the customs and privileg-
es of high society.  Mrs. Astor also revitalized the Astor Foun-
dation and used it to give large sums of money away to the 
Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant communities for affordable 
and elderly housing.31  Remarkably, but very much in charac-
ter, Mrs. Astor was an involved presence who insisted on see-
ing the results of her charitable works on the scene, and tra-
veled to communities a world apart from the one she 
inhabited.32  Her interest in people, regardless of their wealth 
or status, was also reflected in the composition of her dinner 
parties.  She valued guests who were accomplished and engag-
ing more than those who only had pedigree and wealth.  This 
preference was no doubt felt by her son, who could never escape 
his “silver spoon” pedigree, and whose personal qualities fell 
short of the standards set by his mother.33 
A dualistic portrait emerges—one is impressed by the way 
Mrs. Astor used her wealth for the public good, inspired by her 
youthful self-image that helped her defy chronological age,34 
and another amused by her social “boldness” that manifested in 
 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 8. 
32. Id.  On a visit to the South Bronx to inspect affordable homes that 
were being constructed, Brooke approved of the mustard and “lumpy” Rus-
sian dressing in plastic containers provided for their sandwiches.  Id. at 46-
47. 
33. Id. at 9. 
34. Brooke Astor exemplified the limits of defining “old” merely by refer-
ence to chronological age.  Functional capacity, self-perception, and health 
are among the significant factors that shape a person‟s quality of life. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/7
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“provocative and even naughty”35 flirtations with men.  Meryl 
Gordon notes that “[a]t an age when few people are healthy or 
even ambulatory, Brooke Astor was still in the thick of high so-
ciety.”36  Mrs. Astor, however, often acted in a haughty manner; 
she could be imperious and harsh,37 and used her position to se-
ize attention.  She did not have a warm relationship with her 
son, whom she loved, “[b]ut acted like she did not like him.”38  
The enormity of her wealth is shocking and offensive; however, 
that same wealth allowed her to obtain beautiful objects.  
These objects included her sweet smelling Park Avenue apart-
ment and her favorite painting, Up the Avenue from Thirty-
Fourth Street by Childe Hassam,39 which hung over the apart-
ment‟s eighteenth century French marble fireplace in her be-
loved “red lacquered library.”40  This painting would play a role 
in the tragic events that later revealed a vulnerability sur-
rounding Mrs. Astor that could not be fully protected by wealth 
and privilege. 
The key actors in this story emerged at Brooke Astor‟s gala 
100th birthday party on March 20, 2002.  They are literally 
among the 100 of Mrs. Astor‟s “nearest and dearest” with 
whom she enjoyed a deep personal connection.  Mrs. Astor‟s 
demeanor and remarks offered a glimpse of her diminishing 
capacity, the hardships she suffered in the past, and foresha-
dowed the problems on the horizon.  Foremost among those 
problems was a secret known only to a few people: in December 
2000, more than a year before her 100th birthday party, Brooke 
Astor had been diagnosed with Alzheimer‟s Disease.41  The visit 
to the doctor who made the diagnosis was prompted by her 
son‟s concern about an emerging pattern of forgetting names, 
repeating, and some confusion.42  These warning signs were  
also accompanied by an increasingly unsteady gait and a fall, 
not unusual for a person so old, especially with advancing Alz-
 
35. Id. at 15. 
36. Id. at 17. 
37. Id. at 93. 
38. Id. at 22. 
39. This painting is also known as “Flags Fifth Avenue.”  Id. at 10. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 19-20. 
42. Id. at 19. 
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heimer‟s Disease.43  Brooke first became aware of some memory 
loss in the early 1990s, when she started to feel her age and de-
cided to wind down the Astor Foundation.44  She broke her hip 
in 1997 when she fell at the Museum of Natural History.45  By 
2002, conversation was made difficult by her “wandering 
mind,”46 and she burst into tears when she was unable to re-
member her Maine gardener‟s name, although she had known 
him for thirty-seven years.47  Brooke Astor experienced the de-
cline that accompanies age and dementia: a fall, a broken hip, 
challenges to privacy, dignity, and independence, the onset, 
progression, and manifestations of dementia, and the need for 
care at home—fortunately for Mrs. Astor, her money paid for a 
butler, various aides, cooks, and other household help. 
Anthony Marshall had always disapproved of his mother‟s 
extravagance.  Marshall was aging and experiencing his own 
health problems, which apparently made him contemplate, 
with some impatience and anxiety, the prospects for enjoying 
and controlling the considerable inheritance he expected.48  As 
Brooke‟s capacity declined around her 100th birthday, her son 
became more involved in “supervising the household.”49  The 
“business” of family caregiving is admirable but challenging, 
particularly when money becomes intertwined with the care 
that previously was incidental to the family relationship, and 
money is ubiquitous in the Astor family.  Yet Brooke had pre-
viously purchased an apartment for her son, and in 1999 gave 
him $3.9 million to buy it from her.50  Notably, Mrs. Astor‟s ge-
nerosity to her son predated his heightened responsibilities for 
her care as a result of her diminishing mental and physical ca-
pacity. 
Another key figure at Mrs. Astor‟s 100th birthday was 
Charlene Marshall, Anthony‟s third wife, whom he met while 
they were both married to other people (she to the local minis-
ter at the church in the Maine town where the Astors had their 
 
43. Id. at 20. 
44. Id. at 103. 
45. Id. at 107. 
46. Id. at 108. 
47. Id. at 111. 
48. Id. at 104. 
49. Id. at 20. 
50. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/7
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summer home).  Their subsequent romance, divorces from their 
respective spouses, and marriage to each other, humiliated and 
horrified Mrs. Astor, and she never forgave Charlene.51  The 
passage of time did not soften her feelings towards Charlene.  
Mrs. Astor did not want to be escorted to her 100th birthday 
party by Anthony and Charlene, and shortly before her birth-
day, she gave her friend Annette de la Renta a $75,000 neck-
lace, telling Henry Kissinger that she did not want “[C]harlene 
to get it.”52  At the party, Charlene and Anthony were not 
seated at Brooke‟s table, and when Anthony arranged to have 
Charlene deliver flowers sent by Prince Charles to Brooke at 
her table—“to establish the impression of a relationship”—
Brooke‟s visible displeasure reverberated throughout the room 
and humiliated Charlene.53 
The birthday celebration of Brooke Astor and her 
“[l]ifetime of meaningful and memorable gestures” also in-
cluded her lawyer, Henry “Terry” Christensen III.  He was the 
third generation of lawyers to represent Mrs. Astor from the 
venerable firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, a relationship that be-
gan in 1959 when they “fended off” a challenge to Vincent As-
tor‟s will.54  In recent years, most of the legal work involved 
updates of Mrs. Astor‟s will, increasing and diminishing re-
wards to friends, family, and charities from her $120 million 
estate, plus the $60 million charitable trust she controlled.55  
Previously, on January 30, 2002, shortly before her 100th 
birthday party, Mrs. Astor executed a new will under Christen-
sen‟s supervision.  The will gave Anthony Marshall the Maine 
property, but included an important request that he would give 
his son and her grandson Philip an “interest” in the property 
after Anthony‟s death.  Although not mandatory, if read to-
gether with other language in the will, this “hope” was in-
tended to encourage her son Anthony to leave the “Maine re-
treat” to his son Phillip, Mrs. Astor‟s grandson, rather than 
leaving it to his wife Charlene.56  Ominously, we learn that at-
torney Christensen not only had his own relationship with An-
 
51. Id. at 113, 120, 122. 
52. Id. at 24. 
53. Id. at 31. 
54. Id. at 26. 
55. Id. at 27. 
56. Id. at 126. 
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thony Marshall, but also knew Francis X. Morrissey, the attor-
ney who was also later convicted for crimes committed against 
Mrs. Astor, including forging her signature on the third codicil 
to her 2002 will. 
Among these alleged crimes was Anthony‟s misrepresenta-
tion to Brooke that she needed to sell her beloved Childe Has-
sam painting because she needed the money.  Marshall was 
convicted of the scheme to defraud Mrs. Astor with the sale of 
the painting, but was not convicted of grand larceny for taking 
a $2 million commission from the sale.  Unfortunately, the 
friend to whom Brooke told this story concluded that Brooke, 
like many elderly widows, worried unnecessarily about mon-
ey.57 
Also present at Brooke‟s 100th birthday party were her for-
ty-nine year old twin grandchildren, Alec and Philip Marshall.  
The twins did not consider themselves to be part of their 
grandmother‟s world, as their parents were divorced when they 
were nine years old and Brooke was not a particularly affectio-
nate or interested grandmother.  However, each had been de-
veloping an increasingly close relationship with their grand-
mother that appeared to be genuine, perhaps because it was 
not based on money.58 
Family dysfunction, often the result of disputes over mon-
ey and property, is a constant theme in the Astor family accord-
ing to Meryl Gordon‟s narrative.  For Philip, the warming of his 
relationship with his grandmother coincided with a marked de-
terioration in his relationship with his father.  About two years 
before Mrs. Astor‟s 100th birthday party, while Philip was vi-
siting her in Maine with his family, she offered to give him the 
cottage by the water on the property.59  Upon hearing of these 
plans, Anthony prevailed on his mother and son to “maintain 
the status quo” but the incident created a rift that never 
healed.60 
Although the “curtain set” on Mrs. Astor‟s public life after 
her 100th birthday, she would live five more years, until her 
death on August 13, 2007 at age 105.  Perhaps due to her 
 
57. Id. at 28. 
58. Id. at 29. 
59. Id. at 34. 
60. Id. at 35. 
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genes, a comfortable lifestyle only a few could afford, or a com-
bination of other factors, Mrs. Astor lived far beyond age 81, 
the average life expectancy of a white woman in the United 
States.61 
Yet these last years proved to be difficult for Brooke Astor, 
as they are for so many people.  About a year before her death, 
in the summer of 2006, Brooke was relegated to her New York 
apartment, as Anthony decided she was not well enough to 
spend the summer in Maine, although he and Charlene were 
spending the summer there.  In the sweltering July heat, 
Brooke had to be taken to the hospital, suffering from pneumo-
nia.  Around this time, Philip informed his father that he filed 
a guardianship petition, a move that led to Armageddon.62 
As the guardianship litigation erupted, the attorneys took 
center stage and shaped many of the events that occurred, in-
cluding the criminal indictments and convictions.  This process 
revealed that two years earlier, in 2004, Anthony Marshall 
fired Brooke‟s long-time attorney Terry Christensen, and re-
placed him with Francis X. Morrissey.  Morrissey was an at-
torney with a checkered professional past that included a two-
year suspension from the practice of law due to improper use of 
client funds.  Morrissey “immediately presided over two codicils 
to Brooke Astor‟s will.”63  These codicils became a central part 
of the subsequent criminal trial against Marshall and Morris-
sey.  Despite the intent to keep the guardianship proceeding 
private by sealing the court record, the vagaries of court filing 
procedures on a late Friday afternoon and a tip received by a 
Daily News reporter led to the explosive headline on the follow-
ing Wednesday: “Disaster for Mrs. Astor.”64  The petition al-
 
61. See NAT‟L CTR. ON HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‟T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2008: WITH SPECIAL FEATURE ON THE HEALTH 
OF YOUNG ADULTS 203 (2008), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf. 
62. GORDON, supra note 4, at 191.  In New York, a guardianship petition 
may be filed by a broad range of people and entities, including family mem-
bers, those residing with the person alleged to be incapacitated, and those 
concerned with the welfare of the person.  N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.06 
(McKinney 2006). 
63. GORDON, supra note 4, at 39. 
64. Id. at 41, 197.  The question of privacy in guardianship proceedings, 
particularly of medical information, social security numbers, bank account 
numbers, and other sensitive information has not been fully resolved by the 
courts.  In the Astor case, the “right” of the media to attend what are usually 
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leged that Mrs. Astor “was living in squalor amid peeling paint 
and was being deprived of medical care,”65 and could not live in 
her bedroom in the winter because it was too cold, forcing her 
to sleep on a couch that reeked of dog urine.66  The petition re-
quested that Annette de la Renta and Chase Bank be ap-
pointed co-guardians.  Although the petition did not mention 
elder abuse, Ira Salzman, Philip‟s attorney, used the term in 
his cover letter to the court accompanying the petition.67 
The Astor guardianship case prompted a huge media blitz, 
and the public was fascinated.  A Senate Hearing on elder 
abuse soon followed, during which Senator Gordon Smith of 
Oregon made the point that abuse is a danger for anybody, re-
gardless of “age, finances, or social status.”68  Meryl Gordon 
notes that there is “something spellbinding about a family fall-
ing apart in public and there‟s a special schadenfreude69 to be 
had when tens of millions of dollars are at stake.”70  While her 
observations about the initial public fascination with the case 
are true, by the time the interminable criminal case against 
Marshall and Morrissey ended after five months, there was 
“[b]arely a whisper of television coverage.”71  The public appe-
tite for substance beyond the sensational is limited, thus prob-
lems such as elder abuse may only grab the attention of politi-
cians if they believe it is a threat to them, to others similarly 
situated, or that it holds out the promise of political gain.72 
Upon the death of her second husband, Brooke was left 
 
public proceedings added an additional dimension to the case. 
65. Id. at 40. 
66. Id. at 41. 
67. Id. at 196. 
68. Id. at 46. 
69. “[E]njoyment attained by the troubles of others.”  Schadenfreude—
Definition and More From the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/schadenfreude (last visited Mar. 
24, 2010). 
70. GORDON, supra note 4, at 48. 
71. Alessandra Stanley, Cameras on Bedrooms and Ballrooms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2009, at WK1. 
72. For example, the Elder Justice Act, which is the first federal legisla-
tion dealing with elder abuse, languished in Congress for almost five years 
after being introduced in the aftermath of the 2004 Congressional hearings 
on elder abuse.  It was reintroduced as the Elder Justice Act of 2009, and to-
gether with the Patient Safety Abuse Prevention Act, was signed into law by 
President Obama as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 6701-6703, 124 Stat. 119, 782 (2010). 
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with $525,000, and felt “poverty stricken.”73  For perhaps the 
only time in the book, Meryl Gordon provides some much 
needed context for Mrs. Astor‟s upper middle class economic 
status as a new widow in 1952: the average family earned 
$4,500, gasoline was twenty-seven cents per gallon, and bread 
cost sixteen cents for a loaf.74  Her third marriage to Vincent 
Astor moved Brooke from “a social nobody . . . on the edges of 
aristocracy” to “Mrs. Astor.”75 
Once freed of the gilded bondage of her last marriage,76 
Mrs. Astor found herself a beneficiary of riches beyond belief.77  
She went on to defy the expectations and disdain of her male 
colleagues at the Astor Foundation and in the world of phi-
lanthropy to make major contributions through the Astor 
Foundation.  In a sense, Brooke Astor‟s story is a story of a 
woman breaking out of a subservient role and asserting her in-
dependence.  Mrs. Astor‟s resilience and (at least public) gene-
rosity is admirable—although she married wealthy men and 
inherited their wealth, she did not completely forget her hum-
ble roots and she retained her appreciation for working-class 
people.78 
Values, morals, and ethical norms are visited on children 
by their parents.  Greed and emotional distance were the defin-
ing standards of behavior set by Mrs. Astor.  Anthony Mar-
 
73. GORDON, supra note 4, at 66. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 72.  Mrs. Astor may have learned how easy it is to change wills 
to reward and punish people and charities accordingly from her husband Vin-
cent Astor, who “perpetually” changed his own will (the various versions of 
which apparently filled “several file cabinet drawers” in the Dutchess County 
Surrogate‟s Court) and made a new will shortly after meeting Brooke, in 
which he gave his “prospective wife” $5 million and a country home.  Id. at 
71. 
76. Mrs. Astor did not want to marry again, saying that she “did not 
want to wind up pushing an old man in a wheelchair.”  Id. at 82. 
77. Vincent‟s will was executed in June 1958, and after his death on 
February 3, 1959, it “made headlines” as it gave Brooke $2 million, named 
her as beneficiary of a $60 million trust, and gave her their New York City 
apartment, Dutchess County country home, and houses in Arizona and 
Maine.  Id. at 76.  Mrs. Astor also was authorized to run the Astor Founda-
tion.  Id. 
78. Mrs. Astor was also a published author of well-received books, in-
cluding PATCHWORK CHILD: EARLY MEMORIES (1993), THE LAST BLOSSOM ON 
THE PLUM TREE: A PERIOD PIECE (1986), and FOOTPRINTS, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: 
BROOKE ASTOR (1981). 
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shall‟s biological father sued him over a trust fund, and al-
though Marshall prevailed, his father continued to hound him, 
and Marshall wrote checks to his father for most of his adult 
life.79  Perhaps more significantly, Anthony did not experience 
warmth and love from his mother, who remarried when he was 
eight years old and shipped him off to boarding school just a 
couple of years later.  Throughout his life, Marshall could not 
escape the “comma”: “Anthony Marshall, Mrs. Vincent Astor‟s 
son.”80  To add insult to injury, Vincent Astor was close to 
Brooke‟s grandsons, Alec and Philip, and for a time gave them 
$100,000 each in his will and nothing to Anthony, although the 
will in effect at Vincent‟s death did not include his sons as be-
neficiaries.  Vincent Astor‟s relationship with the Marshall 
twins, however, caused Anthony to resent them, a feeling that 
simmered for many years.  Remarkably, as children and then 
as adults, Marshall‟s sons learned that if they wanted to see 
their father, they needed an appointment, which fueled their 
own feelings of resentment toward him.81 
The intermingling of money and the family relationship 
between Brooke and her son was formalized in 1980.  After 
stints of government service in the C.I.A. and as an ambassa-
dor to Madagascar and then Trinidad and Tobago in the Nixon 
administration, Marshall began managing his mother‟s money, 
which he continued to do for the next quarter century (Meryl 
Gordon points out that his returns were less than the Standard 
& Poor‟s Index).82  Although she provided her son with a full-
time job managing her assets, Brooke published an autobiogra-
phy in 1980 that described him in demeaning terms.  In subse-
quent years, she used her influence to obtain appointments for 
Anthony on prominent boards—although beneficial to him, 
they lengthened the long shadow Brooke cast over his life. 
In 2002, Mrs. Astor sold her favorite painting by Childe 
Hassam for $10 million, and Anthony Marshall paid a $2 mil-
lion commission to himself (twice the customary amount, al-
though he was not convicted of grand larceny for taking the 
commission).83  Brooke told friends that Anthony wanted it sold 
 
79. GORDON, supra note 4, at 61-62. 
80. Id. at 87. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 129. 
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because she was running out of money.84  Brooke purchased the 
painting in 1971 for $172,000, and in every will she made from 
1992 forward, she gave it to the Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
subject to the condition that it remain on permanent display.85  
After the sale of the painting, it “vanished” from her will. 
Elder abuse is often subtle and intimidation can occur in a 
myriad of ways.  A locked door, hidden eyeglasses, and other 
subtle deprivations and insults often cause significant harm.  
For a frail elder, “aging in place”86 at home often depends on 
making arrangements for proper care and safety.  As Mrs. As-
tor became increasingly dependent and unsteady in 2002, her 
son refused to take measures to ensure her safety.  Sometimes, 
Mrs. Astor wandered at night, but her son denied a request 
from the staff to install a gate at the top of the stairs to prevent 
her from falling.87  This was a particularly cruel decision, and 
foreshadowed the many problems that followed. 
During this time, Marshall consolidated his control over 
Mrs. Astor.  He enlisted the services of the enigmatic attorney 
Francis Morrissey—a man in the shadows of this story and dif-
ficult to assess88—to escort Brooke.  Although Morrissey appar-
ently displayed great care for many of his clients, and could be 
very attentive, he had been suspended from the practice of law 
for two years for financial improprieties.  These allegations in-
cluded exercising duress and undue influence to be named the 
primary beneficiary of a $15 million estate, taking almost 
$927,000 improperly from funds he held in escrow,89 and bene-
fitting from a will that had a signature that appeared different 
than the signature on the client‟s will of the previous year.90  
Once he returned to practice from his suspension, Morrissey 
 
84. Id. at 130. 
85. Id. at 129. 
86. The report of the United Nations 2002 Madrid Conference on Aging 
includes the objective of “Promotion of „ageing [sic] in place‟ in the community 
with due regard to individual preferences and affordable housing options for 
older persons.”  Second World Assembly on Ageing, Apr. 8-12, 2002, Report: 
Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing, ¶ 98, U.N. Doc A/CONF.197/9 
(May 23, 2002). 
87. GORDON, supra note 4, at 133. 
88. Id. at 134. 
89. Id. at 136-37. 
90. Id. at 140.  See Serge F. Kovaleski & Colin Moynihan, Many Clients 
of Astor Lawyer Left Him Bequests in Their Wills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2008, at 
B1. 
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rarely billed his elderly clients, but apparently was named a 
beneficiary in more than a few estates,91 something that has 
always been ethically questionable under prevailing profes-
sional norms.92  Now, as a companion and chaperone for Mrs. 
Astor, he was elevated to an esteemed role among the elite.  
This did not prevent Morrissey from including in one of his 
bills a fee for a dinner he had with Brooke after they left the 
opening of a play produced by Anthony and Charlene.93 
Another significant property transaction occurred in 2003 
when Brooke, with the assistance of her long-time attorney 
Terry Christensen, paid more than $3 million in gift taxes to 
transfer her main property to Anthony.94  When Marshall 
transferred ownership of the Maine property to Charlene six 
months later, he achieved his goal of providing for Charlene, 
regardless of whether he predeceased his mother.  Considering 
the hostile relationship between Mrs. Astor and Charlene, this 
was a particularly dubious decision, although Marshall was not 
charged with any crime in connection with it. 
Meryl Gordon effectively juxtaposes the transactions and 
decisions in which Anthony was involved that consolidated his 
power and inured to his benefit, the actions he took that had 
the effect of isolating his mother, and the mounting evidence of 
harm that led to the filing of the guardianship petition.  For 
example, around the time Brooke transferred her Maine prop-
erty to him, Marshall fired her long time social secretary.  
Shortly after, in a chance dinner with Philip Marshall that 
lasted five hours, the social secretary expressed numerous con-
cerns about Marshall‟s treatment of Brooke, a conversation 
that led directly to the filing of the petition for guardianship.95 
Another indication of Brooke‟s frailty was her fall on June 
24, 2003, which broke her hip.  The subsequent recovery was 
difficult, Brooke was “depressed and listless,” and for the re-
maining four years of her life she would need the assistance of 
 
91. GORDON, supra note 4, at 139. 
92. Generally, an attorney who is not related to the client is required to 
discourage the client from naming the attorney as a beneficiary under a will 
without the independent advice of another attorney.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES 
OF PROF‟L CONDUCT § 1.8(c) (2002). 
93. GORDON, supra note 4, at 146. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 147. 
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nurses.96  During her recuperation, she decided to give her son 
$5 million, expressly for the purpose of taking care of Charlene.  
Meryl Gordon reminds us that just the previous year, Mrs. As-
tor had been so afraid of her finances that she sold her favorite 
painting, but now was giving money away “in surprising direc-
tions.”97 
The capacity to enter into legal transactions, including 
making gifts, can be difficult to assess.  Attorneys have an im-
portant role to play in providing independent counseling and 
advice, and assuring that a client is making an informed deci-
sion.  Mostly, conversations between an attorney and client 
take place in private, and when there is a dispute, it is often a 
matter of recollection and perception as to what actually oc-
curred, and more specifically, whether the client had sufficient 
capacity to make a particular decision.  Unfortunately for Mrs. 
Astor‟s attorney, the conversation that resulted in the decision 
to transfer the $5 million to Anthony, and the execution of a 
letter confirming this decision and authorizing Anthony to 
withdraw the funds, was overheard by members of her staff on 
the baby monitor that had been placed in Brooke‟s room.  Chris 
Ely, her trusted butler, was alarmed that a person who was di-
agnosed with Alzheimer‟s Disease twenty months earlier was 
now making decisions about complex and substantial financial 
matters.98  More troubling was the butler‟s conversation with 
the attorney, Terry Christensen, as he left the apartment.  
Christensen appeared to be trying to get the butler to agree 
that Mrs. Astor was doing well.  Later that day, and the follow-
ing day, Mrs. Astor had no idea what had occurred and what 
she had signed, but did say she felt “foolish.”99 
The pattern of financial improprieties continued.  The 
transfer of the Maine property came to the attention of a 
housekeeper through a public notice in the local Maine paper, 
which she sent to Brooke‟s butler.  The butler told her grand-
son Philip.  Brooke‟s nurses became increasingly concerned 
 
96. Id. at 149. 
97. Id. 
98. It is possible that the progression of Alzheimer‟s Disease can be suf-
ficiently slow so that a person can make decisions about finances after a di-
agnosis, but the capacity to make a particular decision depends on a number 
of factors, including the nature of the decision or transaction, the person‟s ac-
tual capacity, and the effectiveness or detrimental impact of any medication. 
99. GORDON, supra note 4, at 150. 
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about Anthony‟s actions.  At the butler‟s request, they began 
keeping notes, eventually filling thirty “voluminous notebooks” 
over a four-year period documenting Mrs. Astor‟s diminishing 
mental capacity.100 
Against this backdrop, attorney Christensen continued to 
meet with Mrs. Astor to modify her 2002 will, beginning with 
the uniquely titled “First and Final Codicil,” which was ex-
ecuted on December 18, 2003.  After Christensen was replaced, 
a second codicil dated January 12, 2004, gave Anthony $60 mil-
lion at the expense of Brooke‟s favored charities.  The descrip-
tion of the meeting at which Mrs. Astor signed the second codi-
cil is a portrait of lawyers pushing at the boundaries of 
impropriety with a fragile, elderly, and apparently intimidated 
woman.101  Attorney Morrissey supervised a third codicil dated 
March 3, 2004.  In 2006, a handwriting expert in the guardian-
ship proceeding concluded that Brooke Astor‟s signature was a 
forgery.102  In 2009, the jury in the criminal trial agreed and 
Morrissey was convicted of forging her signature on the third 
codicil. 
The bond between frail elders and their caretakers is often 
poignant, but also fraught with issues of race, class, culture 
dissonance, and economic exploitation.103  Anthony engaged in 
a pattern of distant control in which he isolated his mother (for 
example, by firing her longtime butler and close companion), 
consolidated his power, and increased the property he was get-
ting from his mother during her lifetime and upon her death.  
Despite this considerable treachery and trauma, the relation-
ship between Mrs. Astor and her caretakers remained close.  
Mrs. Astor‟s nurses provided much of the information about the 
litany of neglect and the “ubiquity” of attorney Morrissey that 
served as the catalyst for, and shaped the narrative of, the 
guardianship case and ultimately the criminal convictions.104 
In the guardianship case, the strategic decisions made by 
Philip Marshall and his attorney Ira Salzman had significant 
 
100. Id. at 155. 
101. Id. at 161. 
102. See Serge F. Kovaleski, Expert Says Mrs. Astor’s Signature Was 
Forged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at B1. 
103. See, e.g., Ted Conover, The Last Best Friends Money Can Buy, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Nov. 30, 1997, at 132. 
104. See GORDON, supra note 4, at 185. 
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consequences.  One of the nominated guardians, Annette de la 
Renta did not realize the enormity of the responsibility and 
said that she “[d]idn‟t know it would be Armageddon.”105  They 
decided not to try and resolve the issues with Anthony and 
Charlene prior to filing the guardianship petition.  The petition 
included everything but the kitchen sink.106  The allegations 
about financial exploitation were included for leverage, but the 
primary purpose of the petition was to address the problems in 
Brooke‟s personal care.  For example, the conditions in the 
apartment were made to seem as if they were life-threatening 
to Brooke‟s health.107  Fatefully, the allegations of financial ex-
ploitation resulted in the subsequent criminal conviction 
against Anthony Marshall, which his son Philip had not consi-
dered or intended. 
The book has a happy ending of sorts.  In a testament to 
the power of high quality care and a resilient spirit, Brooke As-
tor, at age 104, rediscovered her appetite, gained fifteen 
pounds, and once again was surrounded by her devoted staff 
back at her Holly Hill estate.  Mrs. Astor died on August 13, 
2007, holding hands with her beloved butler Chris Ely, the 
nurses that protected her, and her best friend Annette de la 
Renta.  As expressed by his daughter in an email, Philip Mar-
shall was motivated to help his grandmother by his concern for 
her health and well-being.108  As directed in her will, Brooke‟s 
tombstone read, “I had a wonderful life.”109  Meryl Gordon con-
cludes with the memory of a time when family had finally come 
first for Mrs. Astor.  A visit by her grandson Philip and his 
family in Maine inspired her to give him her cottage by the sea, 
a wish that was ultimately thwarted by her son.  “Five days in 
the life of a family,” according to Gordon, “is so little time, but 
sometimes the memories, and their repercussions, can last for-
ever.”110 
 
105. Id. at 191. 
106. Id. at 194. 
107. Id. at 195. 
108. Id. at 271. 
109. Id. at 275. 
110. Id. at 281.  And true to life, within twenty-four hours of Mrs. As-
tor‟s death, a legal war erupted in Surrogate‟s Court over who should admi-
nister her estate.  Although Chase Manhattan Bank, the co-guardian along 
with Annette de la Renta, who were both the petitioners in the Surrogate‟s 
Court action, claimed it had no choice but to initiate the Surrogate‟s Court 
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Those who knew the Astors wondered what really hap-
pened to set off this firestorm, and Meryl Gordon notes, “[t]ruth 
is elusive.”111  The real story of the neglect and exploitation of 
Brooke Astor may lie not in what happened to her; rather, the 
story may lie with the experiences of the other elderly in New 
York who are neglected, exploited, and abused, with far greater 
consequences to their person and property than those expe-
rienced by Mrs. Astor.112 
 
II. Abuse of Vulnerable Elders: Powers of Attorney and Men in 
Suits as Instruments of Fraud and Exploitation 
 
For the vast majority of people, the consequences of elder 
abuse are not cushioned by the extreme wealth and comfort en-
joyed by Brooke Astor.  The facts in many cases of elder abuse 
are often shocking and provide a sharp counterpoint to Mrs. 
Astor‟s experience of neglect, exploitation, and isolation visited 
on her by her son.113  In the most extreme cases, the actions 
and omissions of family members and caretakers can literally 
be the kiss of death.  Unlike Brooke Astor, most elders who are 
abused or exploited lack the human and financial resources to 
limit the damage inflicted.  Adult protective services114 may not 
be aware of the risk faced by the vulnerable elder, or may fail 
 
action so quickly, the bank could have received permission to continue as 
guardian for limited purposes related to Mrs. Astor‟s property.  Thereafter, 
the indictments were handed down against Mrs. Astor‟s son and one of her 
attorneys. 
111. Id. at 48. 
112. Philip Marshall now views the increased awareness of elder abuse 
as an enduring legacy of his grandmother.  See Sean Gardiner, Philip Mar-
shall: Champion for Elder Justice, AARP BULL. (AARP, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 1, 
2009, available at 
http://bulletin.aarp.org/yourworld/family/articles/wo12_astor.html. 
113. The allegations about financial exploitation were included in the 
guardianship petition for strategic purposes, and the primary purpose of the 
guardianship was to improve Mrs. Astor‟s living conditions and personal care.  
GORDON, supra note 4, at 194-95. 
114. Federal law requires states to provide protective services for adults.  
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1397F (2006).  In New York, adult protective services 
provide a variety of support services for vulnerable adults who are at risk of 
harm, unable to care for themselves, and have no other available sources of 
assistance.  See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 473(1) (McKinney 2003); DAVID 
GOLDFARB & JOSEPH ROSENBERG, NEW YORK ELDER LAW § 15.04(1) (LexisNex-
is/Matthew Bender 2009). 
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to provide appropriate protection.  When an elder is isolated, 
there may not be any person or entity to initiate a guardian-
ship proceeding.  Without a formal complaint, the local prose-
cutor will not investigate or indict. 
Elder abuse is generally defined as the mistreatment or 
exploitation of a person who is at least sixty years of age.115  
The abuse may be physical (including involuntary confine-
ment), sexual, or emotional.116  Neglect involves the infliction of 
physical or emotional distress by a caregiver, and may be active 
(i.e., intentional) or passive (i.e., unintentional).117  Financial 
exploitation is defined as the improper use of money, assets, 
property, or other resources through fraud, false pretenses, 
embezzlement, conspiracy, forgery, falsified records, coerced 
property transfers, or denial of access to property.118 
The National Center on Elder Abuse estimates that be-
tween one and two million people over the age of sixty-five have 
been neglected, abused or exploited by a person whom they de-
pend on for “care or protection.”119  It is generally acknowl-
edged that although elder abuse is well documented, it is un-
derreported,120 and one in twenty older Americans may have 
 
115. Although a person is generally considered to be “elderly” at the age 
of sixty-five (e.g., that is the age requirement for Medicare eligibility), most 
elder abuse programs use age sixty to categorize a person as elderly.  The 
New York Penal Law uses age sixty as the threshold for defining a “vulnera-
ble elderly person.”  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.30(3) (McKinney 2008). 
116. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 473(6)(a)-(c) (McKinney 2003). 
117. Id. § 473(6)(d)-(e). 
118. Id. § 473(6)(g). 
119. NAT‟L CTR. ON ELDER ABUSE, ELDER ABUSE PREVALENCE AND 
INCIDENCE (2005), available at 
http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/ncearoot/Main_Site/pdf/publication/FinalStatistics05
0331.pdf.  It is estimated that about anywhere from 2% to 10% of the elderly 
population has experienced some form of abuse.  Id.  According to the find-
ings of the Elder Justice Act, each year an estimated 500,000 to 5 million 
Americans 65 and older are subjected to abuse, neglect, or exploitation.  
Elder Justice Act of 2008, S. REP. NO. 110-470, § 2(2) (2007).  See also NAT‟L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ELDER MISTREATMENT, ABUSE, NEGLECT AND 
EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA (2003); ERICA WOOD, COMM‟N ON LAW & 
AGING, THE AVAILABILITY AND UTILITY OF INTERDISCIPLINARY DATA IN ELDER 
ABUSE: A WHITE PAPER FOR THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE (2006), 
available at 
http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/ncearoot/Main_Site/pdf/publication/WhitePaper0604
04.pdf. 
120. SENS. GORDON H. SMITH & HERB KOHL, S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 
110TH CONG., GUARDIANSHIP FOR THE ELDERLY: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS AND 
WELFARE OF SENIORS WITH REDUCED CAPACITY 21 (Comm. Print 2007), availa-
23
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been mistreated, abused, or neglected.121  The 2005 Census in 
New York State counted approximately 3.2 million adults sixty 
or older (17.3% of the state‟s population),122 suggesting that 
161,689 adults sixty years of age or older have been abused or 
neglected. 
As in the Astor case, the vast majority of cases of abuse or 
neglect of an elder by another person involve neglect by a fami-
ly member or caregiver.123  The number of reported elder abuse 
cases has increased each year in the past decade,124 although it 
is not clear if that is the result of an increase in abuse, or 
greater awareness and more accessible reporting procedures.125  
The vulnerable elderly, especially those with diminished capac-
ity, are at an increased risk of neglect, exploitation, and abuse.  
Research findings indicate that elders who have been abused 
may die earlier than those who have not been abused, even in 
the absence of chronic conditions or life threatening disease.126  
 
ble at http://aging.senate.gov/minority/_files/guardianship_report.pdf. 
121. See N.Y. CITY DEP‟T FOR THE AGING, ELDER ABUSE HURTS IN MORE 
WAYS THAN ONE (2009), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dfta/downloads/pdf/elder_crime_vic_2009.pdf.  See 
also P. Brownell, A. Welty, & Mark Brennan, Elder Abuse and Neglect, in 
PROJECT 2015: THE FUTURE OF AGING IN NEW YORK STATE, ARTICLES FOR 
DISCUSSION (2000). 
122. See N.Y. CITY DEP‟T FOR THE AGING, QUICK FACTS ON THE ELDERLY IN 
NEW YORK CITY 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dfta/downloads/pdf/quickfact1.pdf.  Using the esti-
mate of the New York City Department of the Aging that 1 in 20 adults 60 
years of age and older have been abused, in New York City, 64,247 have been 
abused out of a 60-plus population of 1,284,946; in the United States, 
2,387,998 have been abused out of a 60-plus population of 47,759,967. 
123. See, e.g., PAMELA B. TEASTER ET AL., NAT‟L CTR. ON ELDER ABUSE, 
2004 STATE SURVEY OF STATE ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES: ABUSE OF ADULTS 
60 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER 20, 22 (2006), available at 
http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/NCEAroot/Main_Site/pdf/2-14-
06%20FINAL%2060+REPORT.pdf (finding that 65.7% of abused elders were 
women, and 65% of the perpetrators were adult children (32.6%), other fami-
ly members (21.5%), or a spouse or intimate partner (11.3%)). 
124. See ROBERT C. DAVIS & JUANJO MEDINA-ARIZA, NAT‟L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, RESULTS FROM AN ELDER ABUSE PREVENTION EXPERIMENT IN NEW 
YORK CITY 2-3 (2001), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188675.pdf. 
125. In an experimental program to prevent elder abuse in New York 
City, the number of reported incidents of abuse actually increased in house-
holds that had received education and intervention from inter-disciplinary 
teams.  Id. at 3. 
126. See Elder Justice Act of 2008, S. REP. NO. 110-470, § 2(4) (2007). 
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Financial exploitation of elders is the fastest growing form 
of elder abuse.127  The Astor case features some of the most 
common types of financial exploitation, albeit cloaked in a ve-
neer of white-collar gentility: it involved an elderly woman, the 
exploiter was a family member, there was financial enmesh-
ment between the exploiter and the elder, and a power of at-
torney was one of the weapons of exploitation.  It is not un-
usual for the exploiter to be a family member, friend, or recent 
acquaintance who comes into the life of the elder or begins to 
assert control at a time when the elder‟s capacity to make deci-
sions is diminishing.  The exercise of power and influence by 
the exploiter may initially be benign and may arise by the na-
ture of the relationship with the elder, but eventually it is 
wielded for the exploiter‟s own benefit and the preferences and 
best interests of the elder become secondary or ignored alto-
gether. 
The following three scenarios illustrate common forms of 
financial exploitation.128  The elder may own a home129 and 
have a modest bank account that is typically replenished each 
month by Social Security Retirement income and perhaps a 
modest pension.130  The elder may supplement her income with 
rent from a tenant, and if the tenant moves out or stops paying 
the rent, the elder may have difficulty staying current with ex-
isting mortgage payments and other expenses.  In this situa-
 
127. It is estimated that the cost of financial exploitation of elders in the 
United States is $2.6 billion annually.  See METLIFE MATURE MKT. INST. ET 
AL., BROKEN TRUST: ELDERS, FAMILY AND FINANCES 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/mmi-study-
broken-trust-elders-family-finances.pdf. 
128. There are other forms of financial exploitation that are growing 
problems, including credit card fraud, identity theft, and telemarketing 
schemes.  See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Telemarketing Fraud Against 
Older Americans, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/Fraud/fraudcon.shtm (last vi-
sited Apr. 3, 2010). 
129. Approximately eighty percent of people age sixty-five years and old-
er in the United States own their residence.  WAN HE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 
105, 111 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-
209.pdf. 
130. The median income of the population age sixty-five years of age and 
older in the United States was $15,422, while the average income was 
$24,418.  Ken McDonnell, Income of the Elderly Population Age 65 and Over, 
2005, EBRI NOTES (Employee Benefit Research Inst., Wash. D.C.) May 2007, 
at 2, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_05-2007.pdf. 
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tion, a reverse mortgage131 may be an effective tool, as it can be 
used to pay off the existing mortgage, and provide either 
monthly income or a line of credit without requiring regular 
payments.  Although the reverse mortgage provides welcome 
relief in the form of monthly “draws” that supplement income, 
or serves as an available line of credit, it can also become a 
source of funds available to the exploiter.  Initially, the exploi-
ter may help the elder obtain necessary services such as home 
care, assist with household finances and bills, and provide care 
and companionship.  As part of this help, the exploiter may in-
duce the elder to sign checks to pay for the expenses of the 
household, including overdue repairs.  Although the checks 
should be made payable directly to the parties that provide the 
services, the elder may write the checks to the caretaker, trust-
ing that the caretaker will make the required payments.  The 
checks may be drawn on the elder‟s bank account or line of cre-
dit (or both) and at first be used for the elder‟s benefit, but 
gradually the caretaker may begin to co-mingle the funds with 
his own, and use them for his own purposes. 
Another exploitative scheme involves fraud, deception, 
coercion, or forgery that reduces or terminates the elder‟s own-
ership interest in her home.  The third party who obtains the 
ownership interest may be a family member or friend who be-
gins to live in the house.  The pretext may be to enable the 
third party to obtain a mortgage to pay for needed repairs, faci-
litate estate planning, or some other ruse.  In some cases, the 
third party may coerce by threatening harm if the elder does 
not transfer ownership of the home.  Although the third party 
may promise to restore the elder‟s ownership interest in the fu-
ture, the elder may have given away all rights to the home, in-
cluding the right to use, occupy, and sell.  A court proceeding is 
necessary in order to rescind the transaction and restore proper 
ownership to the elder.132  Without a court proceeding, the 
 
131. Reverse mortgages are available to homeowners age sixty-two and 
older; no payments are required until the home is sold or the borrower dies, 
although interest accrues and the costs and interest rates are generally high-
er than a conventional mortgage.  See U.S. Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development, HUD FHA Reverse Mortgage for Seniors (HECM), 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hecm/hecmhome.cfm (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010). 
132. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 854 N.Y.S.2d 543 (App. Div. 2008); 
Alston v. Gregory, 721 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div. 2001) (deed voided based on 
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elder is at risk of losing everything connected with the home. 
A third pattern of harm preys on elders who depend on a 
fixed income, usually from Social Security Retirement benefits 
together with a pension, and do not own any substantial assets 
or property.  The exploiter misappropriates monthly income 
and may gain access to bank accounts using a power of attor-
ney, through a representative payee arrangement with Social 
Security, or by accompanying the elder when the check is 
cashed. 
In the Astor case, the weapons used by Anthony Marshall 
to exploit his mother financially were his own (perhaps undue) 
influence, misrepresentation of facts, veiled warnings of money 
problems,133 a power of attorney that he abused to access Mrs. 
Astor‟s funds for his own benefit, and a small cadre of men in 
suits, lawyers who drafted and supervised the execution of 
Mrs. Astor‟s 2002 will and three subsequent codicils.  During 
the period of time when she executed the codicils to her will, 
Mrs. Astor became afraid of men in suits.  This was extremely 
ironic, as she had always valued appearances, particularly 
proper and formal attire.134  Her fear was so great that after 
the guardianship petition was filed, the judge instructed the 
newly-appointed court evaluator not to wear a suit, but rather 
jeans, a tee shirt, and sneakers, when he met with Mrs. As-
tor.135 
 
undue influence and duress). 
133. For example, Marshall convinced his mother not to transfer the 
Maine cottage to his son Philip, and instead prevailed upon her to transfer 
the entire Maine property to him (not revealing that he intended to, and sub-
sequently did, transfer the property to his wife Charlene).  He also caused her 
to sell her beloved painting, Up the Avenue from Thirty-Fourth Street by 
Childe Hassam, by telling her that she needed the money. 
134. In fact, Francis X. Morrissey was the lone attorney for the execution 
of Mrs. Astor‟s third and final codicil in March 2004 because the only other 
available attorney did not have a tie, and Morrissey told him it would be “dis-
respectful” to appear before Mrs. Astor without one.  See Steve Fishman, Mrs. 
Astor’s Baby, N.Y. MAG., Nov. 12, 2007, at 22.  Morrissey was subsequently 
convicted of forging Mrs. Astor‟s signature on this codicil. 
135. GORDON, supra note 4, at 207.  In an Article 81 guardianship, the 
court usually appoints a court evaluator as a neutral party to serve as the 
“eyes and ears” of the court.  The court evaluator reports on the circums-
tances of the person who is alleged to be incapacitated and makes recommen-
dations as to whether a guardian should be appointed, and if so, who should 
serve as guardian and the extent of the powers the court should grant.  See 
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09 (McKinney 2006). 
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As with the neglect of Mrs. Astor‟s personal needs, the 
overall impact of this financial exploitation was not catastroph-
ic, as her total wealth was approximately $180 million, al-
though it involved the loss of perhaps $60 million.136  This part 
of the Astor story suggests the need to examine Brooke Astor‟s 
exploitation within the broader context of power of attorney 
abuse, exploitation of wills and estate plans, available reme-
dies, and the professional norms that govern attorney conduct 
when representing a client with diminished capacity. 
 
A. The Power of Attorney Dilemma: An Effective Planning 
Tool, A License to Steal, and the Aspirations of New York’s 
Revised Statute to Reduce Abuse 
 
In the Astor case, Anthony Marshall used his authority 
under a power of attorney to assert control over and deplete his 
mother‟s assets for his own benefit.137  In doing so, he not only 
apparently violated his obligation as a fiduciary, but also was 
convicted on criminal charges of scheming to defraud and 
grand larceny in connection with those actions.138  The power of 
attorney, despite important benefits as a planning tool,139 has 
also attracted a great deal of notoriety as a “license to steal.”140 
 
136. Unless this money is turned back over to the Astor estate and the 
codicils invalidated, these losses will ultimately be borne primarily by the 
numerous charitable beneficiaries under Mrs. Astor‟s 2002 will.  These chari-
ties include the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the New York Public Li-
brary, which each could lose approximately $10 million. 
137. In New York, the substantially revised power of attorney law is 
titled, “Statutory Short Form and Other Powers of Attorney for Financial Es-
tate Planning.”  N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501 (McKinney 2010). 
138. Marshall abused the power of attorney by using Mrs. Astor‟s funds 
for expenses related to the Maine property (that Mrs. Astor previously gave 
to him, which he then transferred to his wife), the salary of an employee of 
his production company, his own retroactive increase in salary for managing 
his mother‟s assets, and the salary of the captain of his yacht.  GORDON, su-
pra note 4, at 266. 
139. See Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guar-
dianship: Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 29 (2007). 
140. See, e.g., M.R. v. H.R., 240 N.Y. L.J. 8 (Sup. Ct. July 2, 2008) (court 
revoked power of attorney pending hearing on incapacity based on allegation 
that agent, the daughter of the alleged incapacitated person, improperly sold 
her father‟s property and used the proceeds for her own benefit); In re Matter 
of Bell, 237 N.Y. L.J. 111 (Sup. Ct. May, 11, 2007) (court revoked power of at-
torney naming the son of the alleged incapacitated person as agent and set 
aside transfer of real property for less than fair market value); THOMAS 
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A power of attorney may enable a person to avoid the need 
for a costly guardianship proceeding in the event of incapacity 
by designating an agent with specified powers to make deci-
sions about finances and property.141  There may be questions, 
however, as to whether the person had the mental capacity to 
execute the power of attorney.  It is common for a power of at-
torney to be executed after a person exhibits signs of dementia 
or is diagnosed with an underlying medical condition such as 
Alzheimer‟s Disease.142  The standard for executing a power of 
attorney, as with a contract, requires that the principal under-
stand the nature and consequences of the instrument, includ-
ing the act of creating, modifying, or revoking the document, 
the powers being conferred on the agent, and the role, duties, 
 
HILLIARD, SCHUYLER CTR. FOR ANALYSIS & ADVOCACY, POWER FAILURES: POWER 
OF ATTORNEY AUTHORITY AND THE EXPLOITATION OF ELDERLY NEW YORKERS 1 
(2006), available at 
http://www.scaany.org/resources/documents/power_failures.pdf; Jane A. 
Black, The Not-So-Golden Years: Power of Attorney, Elder Abuse, and Why 
Our Laws Are Failing a Vulnerable Population, 82 ST. JOHN‟S L. REV. 289 
(2008); Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the 
Hidden Abuses Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2006). 
141. See, e.g., In re Mildred M.J., 844 N.Y.S.2d 539 (App. Div. 2007) (pe-
tition dismissed where AIP had the capacity to execute advance directives 
and family relationship did not create presumption of undue influence nor a 
confidential relationship so as to shift burden of proof); In re Nellie G., 831 
N.Y.S.2d 473 (App. Div. 2007) (reversing appointment of independent guar-
dian where daughter was agent under springing power of attorney, which 
was available resource rendering appointment of a guardian unnecessary); In 
re Isadora R., 773 N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 2004) (order appointing guardian 
reversed where agent appointed under health care proxy and power of attor-
ney was properly carrying out plan for care of person and management of 
property); In re Guardian for G.S., 841 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (dismiss-
ing petition where AIP executed power of attorney and health care proxy, no 
evidence that AIP lacked capacity to execute the advance directives or that 
the agent had engaged in wrongdoing, and AIP testified that she had confi-
dence in the agent, her son); In re Guardian for S.K., 827 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Sup. 
Ct. 2006) (petition dismissed where nursing home sought payment of fees de-
spite AIP's prior execution of power of attorney and AIP had capacity to ex-
ecute power of attorney). 
142. See, e.g., In re Daniel TT., 830 N.Y.S.2d 827 (App. Div. 2007) (re-
versing dismissal of petition and ordering hearing to determine whether AIP 
had capacity when power of attorney, health care proxy, and irrevocable trust 
were executed); In re Susan Jane G., 823 N.Y.S.2d 102 (App. Div. 2006) (af-
firming appointment of daughters as co-guardians and revocation of power of 
attorney executed when person was incapacitated and health care proxy due 
to agent‟s inability and unwillingness to act); In re Rita R., 811 N.Y.S.2d 89 
(App. Div. 2006) (affirming revocation of will, trust, and advance directives 
based on lack of capacity when documents executed). 
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and obligations of the agent.143 
Significant litigation involving powers of attorney has ari-
sen when an agent has transferred property or money to him-
self or others as a gift or for less than fair market value.144  Ex-
cept in rare circumstances, an agent may not make gifts or 
transfers unless the power of attorney specifically grants that 
authority.145  Even if granted the power to make gifts to him-
self, an agent must act in the best interest of his principal, as 
held by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Ferrara.146  
In Ferrara, the Salvation Army was named as the primary be-
neficiary of the decedent‟s will and when it learned that the en-
tire estate (valued at approximately $800,000) had been dep-
leted, it challenged the gifts made by the agent (the decedent‟s 
nephew) to himself.  The nephew claimed that his uncle in-
tended to give him all of his money and accordingly granted 
 
143. Effective September 1, 2009, this standard was codified as a defini-
tion in the provisions of the General Obligations Law that govern powers of 
attorney.  N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501(3) (McKinney 2010). 
144. See, e.g., In re Ferrara, 852 N.E.2d 138 (N.Y. 2006). 
145. In re Culbreth, 852 N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 2008) (voiding gifts 
made by agent to his mother without grant of authority in power of attorney 
nor evidence that principal intended to make gifts to agent's mother); Mars-
zal v. Anderson, 780 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 2004) (agent who made gifts to 
himself without authorization under power of attorney failed to overcome 
presumption of impropriety and had to return assets to the principal‟s es-
tate); Mary B. v. Peggy D., 764 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 2003) (unauthorized 
gifts made by agent to herself); In re Estate of Naumoff, 754 N.Y.S.2d 70 
(App. Div. 2003) (agent surcharged for value of unauthorized gifts to himself 
and his family, although other gifts found to be authorized, and expenditures 
for the benefit of the principal were proper); Wilder v. Tomaino, 237 N.Y. L.J. 
19 (Sur. Ct. Jan. 29, 2007) (gifts made by agent not authorized by power of 
attorney and not in best interests of principal); In re Hoerter, 836 N.Y.S.2d 
499 (Sur. Ct. 2007) (agent who did not have gifting authority under power of 
attorney not authorized to create joint bank account which by definition 
makes a gift of one-half of the proceeds); Musacchio v. Romagnoli, 235 N.Y. 
L.J. 116 (Sup. Ct. May 18, 2006) (agent who made gifts to himself under a 
general power of attorney failed to rebut the presumption of impropriety and 
violated fiduciary obligation); In re Clinton, 781 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sur. Ct. 2004) 
(court rescinded transfer by agent of individual bank account of principal to 
account naming agent as beneficiary, holding that the transaction was simi-
lar to a gift transaction and required specific authorization in the power of 
attorney or clear and convincing evidence that transaction was authorized).  
But see In re Masterson, 847 N.Y.S.2d 715 (App. Div. 2007) (upholding gifts 
made by agent despite absence of authority in power of attorney where clear 
and convincing evidence of principal's intent to make gifts rebutted presump-
tion of impropriety). 
146. Ferrara, 852 N.E.2d 138. 
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him that authority to do so in the power of attorney.  The court 
rescinded the gifts, holding that although the agent had the au-
thority to make gifts, they were not in the best interest of the 
principal and they were not made for a purpose that was bene-
ficial to the principal.147  An agent who fails to maintain 
records is subject to a surcharge for the failure to account for 
transactions.148 
Against this backdrop, substantial revisions to the power 
of attorney provisions in the New York General Obligations 
Law were enacted, effective September 1, 2009.  Many of the 
revisions were specifically designed to prevent abuse of the 
powers by the agent, although problems with the new law will 
likely lead to further amendments.  The statute revised the 
substantive provisions of the power of attorney form, which 
now includes more detailed “consumer warnings” to both the 
principal and agent.  This is intended to make both principal 
and agent more aware of the purpose and nature of the docu-
ment and the scope of the powers that may be granted to the 
agent.  In order to grant the agent the power to make gifts and 
transfers for less than fair market value, the principal must 
execute a separate statutory major gifts rider.  The principal 
and agent must each execute the power of attorney before a no-
tary public, and the principal must separately execute the sta-
tutory major gifts rider before two witnesses and a notary.149  
The new law increases the level of accountability imposed on 
the agent, provides the option of appointing a person to monitor 
the agent‟s actions, and creates a special proceeding to obtain 
an accounting from the agent and remedy any wrongful actions 
by the agent.  The result is a more complicated form and 
process that may have beneficial effects, but also may discou-
rage the use of powers of attorney as a planning tool due to the 
increased cost and complexity. 
It is questionable whether any of the revised statute‟s sa-
feguards would have prevented Anthony Marshall from abus-
ing his authority under the power of attorney.  Brooke Astor 
trusted her son, but perhaps with better counseling by an inde-
 
147. Id.  See also In re Francis, 239 N.Y. L.J. 50 (Sur. Ct. Mar. 14, 2008) 
(court set aside transfers by agent for his own benefit despite authority in 
power of attorney to make gifts and transfers to himself individually). 
148. In re Gershenoff, 793 N.Y.S.2d 397 (App. Div. 2005). 
149. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501(B) (McKinney 2009). 
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pendent attorney, she would have limited the scope of her son‟s 
authority, or named monitors to oversee his actions.  The sta-
tute now requires the agent to acknowledge her legal responsi-
bilities in executing the power of attorney, which also includes 
a written advisory to the agent that reinforces the nature of the 
agent‟s fiduciary obligation.  It is unlikely that with these safe-
guards Anthony Marshall would have refrained from taking ac-
tions that violated his fiduciary duty and were the basis of sev-
eral of the convictions in his criminal trial.  Marshall‟s 
intelligence and sophistication, and the presence of highly 
skilled lawyers, presumably provided him with sufficient un-
derstanding to assess the prudence and legality of his actions 
and potential liability.  These additional safeguards would not 
have deterred Marshall, either because he viewed his actions 
as a permissible exercise of his authority as agent under the 
power of attorney or, as the jury that convicted him in the crim-
inal trial believed, he had the intent to steal from his mother 
and was willing to assume the risk of getting caught. 
For a less sophisticated exploiter, who lacks access to at-
torneys willing to go along with and facilitate a nefarious 
scheme, the revised power of attorney statute may create ob-
stacles that will reduce the ease with which a person can abuse 
his authority as an agent.  The requirements for executing both 
a power of attorney and statutory major gifts rider are bewil-
dering to a layperson without legal training.  Yet this would 
not prevent the agent from obtaining powers under the power 
of attorney alone that would enable the agent to access bank 
accounts, use other property, and engage in a wide range of 
transactions that could cause considerable financial damage to 
the principal. 
 
B. Exploiting a Person’s Diminished Capacity to Change a 
Will and Estate Plan 
 
Among the central questions in the Astor case are whether 
Mrs. Astor lacked the mental capacity to execute the 2002 will 
and three subsequent codicils and whether the documents were 
the product of fraud and undue influence.  Mrs. Astor executed 
the 2002 will about two years after she was diagnosed with 
Alzheimer‟s Disease, during which time she exhibited persis-
tent signs of diminishing capacity.  The title of the “First and 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/7
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Final Codicil” reflected the concerns that the attorney had 
about Mrs. Astor‟s capacity.150  The second codicil appeared to 
be executed under some duress, and at a time when her lack of 
capacity was even more evident.151  In addition, the jury in the 
criminal case found that the signature on the third codicil had 
been forged by attorney Francis Morrissey. 
In the criminal trial, Judge Bartley framed the issue as 
whether Mrs. Astor lacked the capacity to consent to the ac-
tions taken by Marshall and Morrissey with respect to the 
second and third codicils and transfers of her property.  The is-
sue of whether Mrs. Astor acted voluntarily was not at issue in 
the criminal case.  Just prior to charging the jury, Judge Bart-
ley advised the jury with respect to the second codicil: “[T]here 
is no charge that Mrs. Astor‟s will was overborne or that she 
was coerced into signing something that she did not want to 
sign.”152 
The probate proceeding to follow (in the absence of a set-
tlement) will address the question of whether Mrs. Astor had 
testamentary capacity.  In addition, the objections to Mrs. As-
tor‟s will and codicils will include claims that they were the 
product of fraud and undue influence.153  Testamentary capaci-
ty requires that the testator be capable of knowing her family 
members (traditionally referred to as the “natural objects of 
bounty”), the nature and extent of her property, and the nature 
and consequences of making the will.154  The modern trend in 
New York is to apply these traditional elements to a “contextu-
alized” functional approach that focuses on the testator‟s ability 
to comprehend the specific tasks at hand by assessing whether: 
 
she was capable of knowing and appreciating 
that she was making a disposition of what she 
owned and/or controlled that would take effect 
upon her death, she was capable of understand-
ing what she had, and what she was giving away, 
 
150. John Elignon, Focus on Astor’s Many Wills, and a Lawyer in the 
Middle, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A24. 
151. Id. 
152. Transcript of Record at 17151-52, People v. Marshall, No. 6044/07 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
153. Id. 
154. See In re Estate of Kumstar, 487 N.E.2d 271, 272 (N.Y. 1985). 
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and she was capable of understanding to whom 
she was leaving her property, and why such a 
disposition might or might not comport with so-
cial norms and generally understood family val-
ues.155 
 
A will requires less capacity than any other instrument.156  
The underlying theory for this low standard is twofold.  First, it 
is important to facilitate the execution of wills by people who 
are elderly, sick, vulnerable, and who may be suffering from 
diminished capacity.  Second, a will is a unilateral transaction 
that does not involve the possibility of economic loss during a 
person‟s lifetime.  The extra protection provided by the higher 
standard of capacity for contracts is neither necessary nor ap-
propriate.157  As a result, a person may have sufficient capacity 
to execute a will even if a guardian was appointed based on a 
finding of incapacity.158 
Fraud is another method by which a person can be induced 
to execute a will or codicil contrary to that person‟s true intent.  
Fraud requires an intentional misrepresentation, through a 
false statement or conduct, with the intent to deceive, which 
induces a person to sign a document.159  For example, a person 
may lie about his marital status in order to persuade a lover to 
name him as beneficiary in the will, an adult child may con-
vince a parent to make him the sole beneficiary under a will by 
falsely promising to take care of the other child voluntarily, or 
a person may misrepresent the nature or substance of a docu-
ment in order to induce the person to execute it.160  This last 
 
155. See, e.g., In re Will of Khazaneh, 834 N.Y.S.2d 616, 619 (Sur. Ct. 
2006). 
156. In re Will of Coddington, 118 N.Y.S.2d 525 (App. Div. 1952). 
157. The person executing a contract must understand the nature and 
consequences of the transaction, which as applied requires a higher level of 
capacity than a will.  See, e.g., Ortelere v. Teachers‟ Ret. Bd. of N.Y., 250 
N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) (capacity to designate a beneficiary on a retirement 
plan). 
158. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gallagher, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7639 
(Sur. Ct. Sept. 26, 2007). 
159. WARREN‟S HEATON ON SURROGATE‟S COURT PRACTICE § 42.07 at 15 
(Matthew Bender 2010). 
160. See, e.g., In re Coviello, 870 N.Y.S.2d 369 (App. Div. 2008) (attorney 
committed fraud by misrepresenting the terms of a will which named the at-
torney as a residuary beneficiary, as the structure of the will negated the tes-
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kind of fraud may be more difficult to carry out, as it requires a 
testator who is not examining the contents of the will carefully, 
if at all.  For example, a beneficiary may deceive the testator by 
saying that the testator‟s will provides equally for all the testa-
tor‟s children, when in fact it only provides for that particular 
beneficiary.  A more subtle ploy occurs when the relevant terms 
of the will are not readily apparent, which can result in a will 
that disproportionately or exclusively benefits the beneficiary, 
in conflict with the testator‟s intent.161 
Coercion is the essential element of a claim that a will is 
the product of undue influence.162  The testator must be vul-
nerable to coercion.  Accordingly, the wrongdoer must have the 
motive and opportunity to exert the influence, and actually ex-
ert it in order to invalidate a will.163  Because human relation-
ships are complex, it is difficult to separate permissible and 
wrongful influence.  Thus, courts will consider events that oc-
curred before and after the execution of the will.164  The evi-
dence is often subtle and circumstantial.165  The existence of a 
confidential relationship between the testator and beneficiary 
shifts the burden to the beneficiary of proving that the will was 
not the result of the undue influence.166  A family relationship 
alone is not sufficient to shift the burden of proof.  When the 
family member exercises control over the finances or estate 
planning of the testator, however, courts may find that a fidu-
ciary relationship exists.167 
In the Astor criminal case, the convictions of Marshall and 
 
tator‟s intentions as to the distribution of his property). 
161. Id. 
162. In re Will of Walther, 159 N.E.2d 665 (N.Y. 1959). 
163. In re Estate of Pellegrino, 817 N.Y.S.2d 121 (App. Div. 2006) (codicil 
denied probate based on intentional, subtle, and pervasive actions that 
coerced physically frail testator into disinheriting grandson). 
164. See, e.g., In re Estate of Rosen, 747 N.Y.S.2d 99 (App. Div. 2002). 
165. See In re Estate of Paigo, 863 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (App. Div. 2008) 
(“Because direct proof of undue influence is rare, it may be demonstrated by 
circumstantial evidence of motive, opportunity and the actual exercise of such 
influence.”). 
166. See Prievo v. Urbaniak, 882 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797 (App. Div. 2009). 
167. See, e.g., In re Will of Pennino, 698 N.Y.S.2d 265 (App. Div. 1999) 
(evidence that a widow did not disclose marriage to the testator‟s children 
was “instrumental” in testator executing a will days after their wedding and 
a month before testator‟s death); In re Estate Antoinette, 657 N.Y.S.2d 97 
(App. Div. 1997) (niece who had substantial involvement in aunt‟s finances 
had burden of proof). 
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Morrissey on charges related to the execution of the codicils to 
the 2002 will, based on evidence that established guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, foreshadow the probable outcome of the will 
contest in Surrogate‟s Court.  The convictions involve findings 
that Marshall and Morrissey intentionally deceived Mrs. Astor, 
which will certainly be relevant to the question of whether the 
first and second codicils were the result of fraud.  The convic-
tion of attorney Morrissey on the charge of forging Mrs. Astor‟s 
signature on the third codicil suggests that that instrument 
will be invalidated.  The issue of Mrs. Astor‟s capacity to con-
sent to the transactions that gave rise to the criminal trial was 
central and the significant testimony related to her mental ca-
pacity will directly bear on the question of her capacity to ex-
ecute not only the codicils, but the 2002 will, which was super-
vised by her attorney Terry Christensen at a time when her 
capacity was questionable.168 
 
III. Guardianship, Criminal Prosecution, and a Will Contest as 
Remedies for Elder Abuse and Exploitation 
 
The Astor case included three primary remedies for sus-
pected elder abuse:169 a formal guardianship proceeding under 
 
168. If the 2002 will is invalidated, Mrs. Astor‟s prior will executed in 
1997 will control the distribution of her property. 
169. One remedy that was not part of the Astor case was intervention by 
the local adult protective services agency (APS).  See supra note 114.  Prob-
lems with the quality of services provided by adult protective services in New 
York and other states, due to lack of resources, inadequate training, and un-
lawful actions, have been documented in cases and newspaper articles.  See, 
e.g., Van Cortlandt v. Westchester County, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80977 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2007) (court denied motion to dismiss elderly petitioner‟s 
allegations that APS unlawfully and without justification removed her from 
her home and involuntarily committed her without justification, finding suffi-
cient claim of unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Pam Bel-
luck & Joe Sexton, Old and Unprotected: A Special Report: Problems of the 
Aged Overwhelm an Agency, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1996, at 1; Ralph Blumen-
thal & Barbara Novovitch, Texas Agency for Elderly Under Fire Over Neglect, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at A12 (describing how APS failed to address prob-
lems of elders in rural West Texas, leading to unnecessary suffering and pos-
sibly preventable deaths, noting inadequacy of investigation process); Mary 
Jane Smetanka, Growing Fear: Elders Swindled by Family, STAR TRIB. (Min-
neapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Feb. 10, 2008, at A1 (describing how Hennepin 
County APS only investigated 126 of 700 allegations of financial exploitation 
in 2007, with only twenty substantiated, and fewer than 5% resulting in 
criminal charges). 
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Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law, criminal prosecution, 
and a will contest.  In this section I describe these remedies 
and examine how they were applied in the Astor case. 
 
A. Use of Guardianships to Remedy Elder Abuse 
 
For elders who lack the capacity to make decisions about 
property management and personal needs, a court-appointed 
guardian is a primary remedy to prevent or stop abuse.170  A 
person is presumed to have the capacity to make decisions.  A 
person‟s autonomy is protected as a liberty interest under the 
U.S. Constitution.171  A person has the right to make decisions 
that are not in the person‟s best interest, even if ill-considered, 
irresponsible, offensive, and even self-destructive.172 
The capacity to make decisions depends on the person‟s 
cognitive limitations.  A 2004 report from the U.S. Senate Spe-
cial Committee on Aging stated that: 
 
Capacity is situational because different degrees 
of capacity are required for different tasks and 
transient because individuals can have both pe-
riods of relative lucidity and confusion.  At any 
given point in time, capacity also may be influ-
enced by external forces, such as lack of sleep or 
 
170. Guardianship is generally based on a finding of incapacity due to 
dementia, mental illness, or other generally irreversible and progressive cog-
nitive impairments.  In 2008, 5.2 million people had been diagnosed with 
Alzheimer‟s Disease, the most common form of dementia, the majority of 
whom are 65 and older.  ALZHEIMER‟S ASS‟N, 2008 ALZHEIMER‟S DISEASE FACTS 
AND FIGURES 9 (2008), available at 
http://www.nadsa.org/publications/documents/2008_Alzheimers_Facts_web.p
df. 
171. “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Among the due process safe-
guards are the use of evidentiary rules that are an essential feature of adver-
sarial litigation.  See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(b) (McKinney 2006) 
(determination of incapacity must be based on clear and convincing evidence); 
id. § 81.11(b)(1) (any party has right to present evidence); In re Kang Yun Yu, 
824 N.Y.S.2d 882 (App. Div. 2006) (medical records protected by physician-
patient privilege not admissible in guardianship proceeding).  Another impor-
tant safeguard are provisions requiring the appointment of an attorney for 
the person alleged to be incapacitated.  See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 
81.10. 
172. See, e.g., In re Grinker, 573 N.E.2d 536 (N.Y. 1991). 
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medication.173 
 
A guardianship is generally necessary if alternative re-
sources are not available (for example, a power of attorney, liv-
ing will, health care proxy, a representative payee for Social 
Security benefits, or a trust for property management)174 or if a 
previously appointed agent or trustee is violating her fiduciary 
duty.175  A court-appointed guardian has formal decision-
making authority that is supposed to be used in ways that hon-
or the autonomy of the person, but also provide necessary pro-
tection. 
Under Article 81 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law, 
and most modern guardianship statutes,176 a person who is al-
 
173. See SMITH & KOHL, supra note 120, at 13.  See also Hollis E. Clow & 
Edward B. Allen, Psychiatric Aspects in the Mental Competency of Aging, 50 
J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC‟Y 1879 (2002); Robert P. Roca, Determining Decisional 
Capacity: A Medical Perspective, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177 (1994); Loren H. 
Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
134, 279-84 (1977). 
174. See, e.g., Charles P. Sabatino, The Legal and Functional Status of 
the Medical Proxy: Suggestions for Statutory Reform, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 
52 (1999); Paul F. Stavis, The Nexum: A Modest Proposal for Self-
Guardianship by Contract: A System of Advance Directives and Surrogate 
Committees-At-Large for the Intermittently Mentally Ill, 16 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL‟Y 1 (1999); Linda Whitten, Durable Powers as an Alternative 
to Guardianship: Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 7 (2007); 
Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Planning for the Future Through Advance Direc-
tive Instruments, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‟Y & L. 579 (1998). 
175. See, e.g., In re Wingate, 647 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (in Article 
81 guardianship proceeding, court revoked power of attorney after agent 
failed to sell the incapacitated person‟s cooperative apartment in order to 
qualify for Medicaid). 
176. State guardianship laws have improved significantly, although 
problems remain, primarily in the area of monitoring of guardians.  See, e.g., 
Jeff Kelly, Maggie Kowalski, & Candice Novak, Courts Strip Elders of Inde-
pendence, BOSTONGLOBE.COM, Jan. 13, 2008, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/01/13/courts_strip_elders_of_t
heir_independence/.  See also NAOMI KARP & ERICA WOOD, AARP PUB. POLICY 
INST., GUARDING THE GUARDIANS: PROMISING PRACTICES FOR COURT 
MONITORING 14-17 (2007); PAMELA B. TEASTER ET AL., WARDS OF THE STATE: A 
NATIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP 99-122 (2005), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/aging/publications/docs/wardofstatefinal.pdf; U.S. 
GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GUARDIANSHIPS: COLLABORATION NEEDED TO 
PROTECT INCAPACITATED ELDERLY PEOPLE (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04655.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (inade-
quate monitoring of guardians due to problems implementing existing law 
and poor training). 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/7
1042 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
leged to be incapacitated177 is entitled to a hearing to determine 
whether the two-pronged test under Article 81 is satisfied: 
first, that the appointment of a guardian is necessary, and 
second, that the person either consents or is found to be inca-
pacitated.178  A determination of incapacity is based on clear 
and convincing evidence that the person is likely to suffer harm 
because “the person cannot adequately understand and appre-
ciate the nature and consequences of such inability.”179  A 
guardian may be appointed to make particular decisions about 
property management180 and personal needs.181  In practice, 
some judges use the term “person in need of a guardian,” which 
may be more accurate than the term incapacitated, particularly 
in cases where a guardianship is used as a means to access ne-
cessary social and support services, housing, government bene-
fits, case management, or home care.  The lack of these services 
may be more of a problem than the person‟s actual inability to 
make and understand the consequences of decisions. 
A guardianship can be an effective tool for preventing or 
stopping abuse or neglect, and a court has the authority to re-
voke transactions entered into when the person lacked capacity 
 
177. Under Article 81, the term “incapacitated” has replaced “incompe-
tent,” as it does not convey a negative meaning and reflects the reality that 
capacity diminishes along a continuum and affects particular areas of cogni-
tive functioning and decision-making.  The use of a term that is more scientif-
ically accurate and demonstrates sensitivity to the dignity of the person 
should have a positive impact, as studies have shown that language and ter-
minology shape attitudes.  See, e.g., Sik Hung Ng, Language-Based Discrimi-
nation: Blatant and Subtle Forms, 26 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 106, 117 
(2007), available at http://jls.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/26/2/106 (con-
descending communication to elders causes reactions that reinforce stereo-
types that they are needy or less capable); Kathleen Riach, ‘Othering’ Older 
Worker Identity in Recruitment, 60 HUM. REL. 1701 (2007), available at 
http://hum.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/60/11/1701 (analyzing how lan-
guage used to portray workers over age 50 creates negative attributes based 
on age rather than behavior). 
178. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(a) (McKinney 2006). 
179. Id. § 81.02(b). 
180. Property management powers include decisions regarding gifts, 
support for dependents, contracts, trusts, confidential records, government 
benefits, paying bills, Medicaid and estate planning, and defending or main-
taining lawsuits.  Id. § 81.21. 
181. Personal needs powers include decisions about personal care, social 
environment and social life, travel, license to drive, confidential records, gov-
ernment and private benefits, education, health care and medical treatment, 
and place of residence and living arrangements.  Id. § 81.22. 
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or that are the result of undue influence.182  A guardian can   
also violate a person‟s liberty interests, invade privacy, destroy 
autonomy, and misuse and convert property.183  As a fiduciary, 
a guardian is held to the highest standard of conduct, and in 
the immortal words of Justice Cardozo: “Not honesty alone, but 
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive is then the stan-
dard of behavior.”184  An increasing number of states provide 
extensive procedures for monitoring185 the conduct of court-
appointed guardians186 to ensure that they fulfill their respon-
sibilities.  Despite the strong framework for post-appointment 
monitoring of guardians under Article 81 that reflects best 
practices for monitoring, effective implementation is difficult 
due to inadequate resources and the challenges of meeting the 
needs of vulnerable elders who are incapacitated.187 
 
182. N.Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 81.29(d).  See, e.g., In re Doar, 243 N.Y. L.J. 
42 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 18, 2009) (rescinding reverse mortgages). 
183. See, e.g., In re Phillips, 867 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (surcharg-
ing guardian $403,148 for extreme violations of fiduciary duties that resulted 
in extensive misuse of ward‟s assets).  See also REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY OF 
THE SUPREME COURT, QUEENS COUNTY, ISSUED PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE LAW § 190.85(1)(C) CONCERNING THEFTS FROM GUARDIANSHIPS 
(2004), http://www.queensda.org/newpressreleases/2004/03-03-
2004_Grand_jury.htm (documenting financial exploitation by an attorney ap-
pointed as a guardian in numerous cases under Article 81, and the systemat-
ic failures and inadequacy of the monitoring system).  New York subsequent-
ly enacted many of the Grand Jury recommendations.  See 22 N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36 (2004). 
184. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
185. GAO REPORT, supra note 176, at 9.  Essential features of a monitor-
ing system include background checks of a guardian and disqualification if a 
guardian has a criminal conviction, requirements that a guardian attend a 
training session, visit the incapacitated person a number of times each year, 
file a bond for property, and file initial, annual, and final reports that are re-
viewed by the court or a designee.  Id. at 21 (listing requirements and prac-
tices of four courts cited as “exemplary” in their oversight of adult guardian-
ships, each of which included most or all of these oversight mechanisms and 
court practices that went beyond the requirements of state law, such as peri-
odic visits by court investigators with the incapacitated person).  See Joseph 
A. Rosenberg, Poverty, Guardianship, and the Vulnerable Elderly: Human 
Narrative and Statistical Patterns in a Snapshot of Adult Guardianship Cas-
es in New York City, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‟Y 315, 320 n.12 (2009) 
(discussing a report by the Committee on Legal Problems of the Aging of the 
Association for the Bar of the City of New York, which included comprehen-
sive findings on the need for, and recommendations regarding, guardianship 
monitoring). 
186. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 185, at 320 n.13. 
187. See, e.g., Beth Baker, Who Guards the Guardians of the Vulnerable 
Elderly?, AARP BULL., (AARP, Wash., D.C.), Apr. 21, 2008 
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If a guardian is not fulfilling his obligations, New York law 
provides for a “court examiner” to review the guardian‟s initial 
and annual reports to assure that the guardian is fulfilling his 
duties or to remove the guardian.  Although the annual report 
is supposed to be comprehensive,188 it may nevertheless lack in-
depth information about the personal needs of the incapaci-
tated person, and may not alert the court examiner that a per-
son is being neglected or mistreated.  Primarily, due to an ex-
cessive caseload, a court examiner may not promptly review a 
report or notice that a report has not been filed, and problems 
in the care of the person or in the management of income and 
assets might go undetected.  The court examiner may also as-
sume, often correctly, that a person should continue living with 
a certain level of care at home or in a nursing home for life.189  
Without an advocate, the most vulnerable, particularly those 
without financial resources, may fall through the cracks forev-
er. 
Brooke Astor was in no such danger.  The guardianship 
proceeding, however, had significant consequences for Mrs. As-
tor and her family, some of which were beneficial, and others 
destructive.  On the positive side, it stopped the derivations she 
suffered due to her son‟s acts and omissions.  A court order 
barred her daughter-in-law Charlene from visiting her.  The 
guardianship may have increased public awareness of the prob-
lem of elder abuse and neglect.  Another benefit was the ap-
pointment of Susan Robbins as Mrs. Astor‟s attorney in the 
 
http://bulletin.aarp.org/yourhealth/caregiving/articles/who_guards_the_guard
ians.html. 
188. For example, the annual report must include information about 
changes in the mental and physical condition of the incapacitated person, the 
nature and extent of the most recent appointment with a physician, an eval-
uation of the person by a health care professional or social worker, a state-
ment of the suitability of the current residential setting, a summary of pro-
fessional medical treatment received during the year, and the plan for 
treatment and services.  N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.30-81.31 (McKinney 
2006). 
189. In New York, in order to exercise the power to place a person who is 
incapacitated in a nursing home without consent, there must be a finding 
that it is not reasonable to remain or return to the community.  N.Y. MENTAL 
HYG. LAW § 81.21(d)(1).  See also Eggleston v. Gloria N., 865 N.Y.S.2d 49 
(App. Div. 2008) (court reversed order granting guardian the power to place 
in a facility where it was reasonable to maintain the incapacitated person in 
the community and her due process rights were violated by the failure to pro-
vide adequate notice and a hearing). 
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guardianship case.190  Ms. Robbins was a solo practitioner with 
a public interest practice for elders and people with disabilities.  
Ms. Robbins emerged as the only attorney who truly fulfilled 
her professional obligations to Mrs. Astor with empathy, care, 
and vigorous advocacy.  The filing of the guardianship petition 
also revealed the “smoking gun” of the case in the form of a 
seven-page letter written by Anthony Marshall to the doctor 
who diagnosed Mrs. Astor with Alzheimer‟s Disease.  The let-
ter, dated December 26, 2000, detailed Brooke‟s cognitive limi-
tations, more than a year before she executed her 2002 will.191 
In contrast, the guardianship case essentially destroyed 
the Astor/Marshall family relationships, at least between An-
thony Marshall and his mother and children, and ignited dis-
tasteful, excessive publicity,192 and resulted in astronomical le-
gal fees.193  The loss of privacy is inherent in a public court 
proceeding, although in a guardianship case, the person alleged 
to be incapacitated is often an unwilling or involuntary partici-
pant.  The assessment of functional and decision-making capac-
ity is often inextricably intertwined with a person‟s medical 
condition, psychological well-being, and family relationships.  
In the Astor guardianship case, despite Brooke Astor‟s position 
as a public figure, the court mitigated her loss of privacy by or-
dering that the court evaluator‟s report as well as Mrs. Astor‟s 
medical and psychological records be sealed.194 
The specific impact on Anthony Marshall is less easily ca-
tegorized.  Although not a sympathetic figure, Marshall was in-
itially placed at a severe disadvantage in defending himself in 
 
190. One of the key due process protections included in New York law is 
the mandatory appointment of an attorney under specifically enumerated cir-
cumstances.  N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10. 
191. GORDON, supra note 4, at 220. 
192. Id. at 200, 201, 205. 
193. Id. at 207.  There were a total of 56 lawyers and 65 legal assistants, 
whose request for $3.3 million in fees was reduced to $2.2 million.  In re Mar-
shall, 831 N.Y.S.2d 360, 360 (Sup. Ct. 2006); GORDON, supra note 4, at 232.  
Meryl Gordon noted that the “[l]awyers wanted every penny.”  GORDON, su-
pra note 4, at 232.  Significantly, the judge ordered that Anthony Marshall be 
reimbursed for $409,000 in legal fees from Mrs. Astor‟s property (approx-
imately one-half of the fees requested by his attorneys) because although he 
was not a prevailing party, the allegations of intentional abuse were not 
substantiated by competent evidence at a trial.  Marshall, 831 N.Y.S.2d, at 
360; GORDON, supra note 4, at 232. 
194. Marshall, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 360. 
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the guardianship case when the court ordered that his salary 
be suspended and locked him out of his office.195  It also led to 
the successful criminal prosecution of Marshall and his accom-
plice Morrissey. 
The Astor guardianship petition did not culminate in a full 
hearing to resolve the allegations in the petition.  The case was 
settled when Anthony Marshall agreed to pay $1.35 million to 
the Internal Revenue Service in penalties and interest in con-
nection with his mother‟s income tax liability, return approx-
imately $11 million worth of cash, jewelry, and artwork, and 
relinquish authority over her finances and health care.  He also 
agreed that he and his wife would not serve as co-executors of 
her estate.196 
The final significant result of the guardianship petition 
was the court evaluator‟s finding that there was no physical or 
medical abuse.197  This is difficult to categorize as positive or 
negative.  Considering that most experts agree that elder abuse 
is underreported,198 it is a somewhat grim irony that in the 
case of an astronomically rich socialite, the allegations of abuse 
may have been exaggerated. 
 
B. Criminal Neglect, Abuse, and Exploitation of a Vulnerable 
Elder 
 
An elderly, disabled and helpless person is left 
alone, awash in his or her own human wastes, 
with resulting bed sores so extensive and severe 
as to have culminated in life-threatening sepsis, 
and there is additional evidence that the person 
was malnourished to the point of starvation, and 
 
195. GORDON, supra note 4, at 202. 
196. See Serge F. Kovaleski & Mike McIntire, Lawyer Advising on Astor 
Affairs Was Suspended for Two Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at B1.  The 
terms of a proposed settlement were agreeable to all the parties, except for 
Susan Robbins, Mrs. Astor‟s attorney, who wanted the court to invalidate the 
2002 will and all three codicils and rescind Mrs. Astor‟s transfer of the Maine 
property and $5 million in cash to her son.  GORDON, supra note 4, at 225. 
197. GORDON, supra note 4, at 233. 
198. See SMITH & KOHL, supra note 120, at 21; Ron Aciemo et al., Preva-
lence and Correlates of Emotional, Physical, Sexual, and Financial Abuse and 
Potential Neglect in the United States: The National Elder Mistreat Study, 
100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 292 (2010). 
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severely dehydrated, while occupying a room in a 
house where another adult family member, or 
members, reside.  The result of the culpable neg-
lect is death.  A moral duty was clearly breached 
by the adult family members living in the house 
where the elderly person suffered such abject 
neglect, we all agree.  But we also think a legal 
duty was breached . . . .199 
 
Lee and James Peterson were brothers who lived in Flori-
da with their elderly mother, but their horrifying story vividly 
illustrates the most extreme form of elder abuse that tran-
scends jurisdictional boundaries.  Because Lee worked long 
hours, the brothers agreed that James would assume the re-
sponsibility for taking care of their mother.  Fatally for “Mrs. 
Peterson,”200 James did not provide appropriate care and nei-
ther did Lee.  Neglected, abused, and without the means to 
save herself, Mrs. Peterson died at age eighty-two and Lee Pe-
terson appealed from his conviction for aggravated manslaugh-
ter of an elderly or disabled person.201  The legal question on 
appeal was whether Lee should be held criminally responsible, 
despite the fact that there was no dispute that his brother had 
agreed to care for their mother.  The statute applied to a “care-
giver,” defined as a person “[e]ntrusted with or [who] has as-
sumed responsibility for the care or the property of an elderly 
person,” and whose actions or omissions resulted in a failure to 
provide for the person‟s physical and mental health, resulting 
in “physical or psychological injury, or substantial risk of 
death.”202 
 
199. Peterson v. State, 765 So. 2d 861, 864 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
200. Remarkably, the victim‟s full name was never used in the decision.  
She was only referred to as “mother” or “Mrs. Peterson.”  This may be part of 
a larger pattern or propensity by judges to marginalize poor, elderly women 
in their decisions.  See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, A Servant of One’s Own: The 
Continuing Class Struggle in Feminist Legal Theories and Practices, 23 
BERKELEY J. GEN. L. & JUST. 392 (2008) (noting how the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007), only refers to 
plaintiff Evelyn Coke by name once, then twice more by her last name only, 
and then she fades into obscurity as “respondent”). 
201. Peterson, 765 So. 2d at 862. 
202. Id. at 862-63. 
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In affirming Lee Peterson‟s conviction, the court noted that 
if it failed to apply the statute, it would be providing Mrs. Pe-
terson with less legal protection than is provided for cats and 
dogs.203  The allegations of mistreatment, neglect, and isolation 
in the Astor guardianship case pale in comparison to the ac-
tions that resulted in Mrs. Peterson‟s death.  Ironically, al-
though the motivation for filing the guardianship petition was 
to improve Mrs. Astor‟s living conditions and not to remedy any 
financial exploitation, none of these allegations were found to 
be true by the guardianship court, as the case was settled 
without any findings of fact on those allegations.  The criminal 
charges only involved financial exploitation, not physical abuse 
or neglect.204 
A criminal conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  This is a far more exacting standard than the clear and 
convincing standard required to appoint a guardian, or the 
even lesser preponderance of the evidence standard applied in 
a will contest.  Judge Bartley defined proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt in his instructions to the Astor jury: 
 
An honest doubt of the defendant‟s guilt for 
which a reason exists based upon the nature and 
quality of the evidence.  It is an actual doubt, not 
an imaginary doubt.  It is a doubt that a reason-
able person, acting in a manner of this impor-
tance, would be likely to entertain because of the 
evidence that was presented or because of the 
 
203. Id. at 863 n.1.  For another case discussing the scope of liability re-
garding the death of an elderly parent, see People v. Heitzman, 886 P.2d 1229 
(Cal. 1994).  In Heitzman, the court held that two sons who lived with the de-
cedent and were his primary caregivers were guilty of criminal neglect, but a 
daughter who did not live with her father, but who was aware of the neglect, 
did not owe a legal duty of care to intervene.  The court held that the applica-
ble statute was “unconstitutionally vague.”  Id. at 1231. 
204. The New York Penal Law includes provisions that specifically ad-
dress crimes against vulnerable elders.  See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
120.05(12) (McKinney 2009) (assault of an elderly person over the age of 65 
who is at least ten years older than the assailant); id. § 260.25 (endangering 
the welfare of a person unable to care for herself); id. § 260.32 (caregiver as-
sault or sexual abuse of a vulnerable elder).  Effective May 22, 2010, these 
crimes will also include a person who is “incompetent or physically disabled.”  
See 2010 N.Y. Laws, ch. 14 (Mar. 23, 2010). 
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lack of convincing evidence.205 
 
Anthony Marshall and Francis X. Morrissey were con-
victed of numerous crimes involving theft, exploitation, misuse 
of funds, and fraud.  Anthony Marshall received concurrent 
one-year sentences for each count on which he was convicted.  
Francis X. Morrissey was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 
one to three years for convictions on the counts of scheming to 
defraud and forging the third codicil to Mrs. Astor‟s 2002 will.  
Although the proof of intent and egregiousness of the acts (and 
perhaps the available resources of the prosecutor) are factors in 
determining whether a person should be charged with a crime, 
it appears likely that the wealth and celebrity of the Astors 
might have also played a role. 
The charges in the Astor case revolved around the actions 
of Anthony Marshall and Francis X. Morrissey, individually 
and together.  Their actions resulted in the taking of property 
from Brooke Astor through a variety of means, including Mar-
shall‟s use of a power of attorney, theft of property, inducement 
to her to execute a second codicil, and Morrissey‟s forgery of 
Mrs. Astor‟s signature on the third codicil.  The period of time 
during which the scheme took place was December 1, 2001 
through September 11, 2007. 
Count One charged both defendants with a scheme to de-
fraud in the first degree, which included the abuse of the power 
of attorney.206  This charge related to a variety of actions by 
both Marshall and Morrissey that exploited Brooke Astor‟s di-
minished capacity to obtain property worth more than 
$100,000.  The judge explained that: 
 
[W]hat is required is a plan to defraud more than 
one person or to deprive persons of property by 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representation or 
promises.  A representation is fraudulent when it 
relates to a material fact that is falsely made 
with the intent to deceive.207 
 
205. Transcript of Record, supra note 152, at 17164-65. 
206. These were counts two, five, six, eight, fifteen, sixteen and seven-
teen.  Id. at 17173. 
207. Id. at 17175. 
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Both Marshall and Morrissey were convicted on the 
scheme to defraud count. 
Several counts charged Mr. Marshall with grand larce-
ny.208  Count Two alleged that the $2 million commission re-
sulting from Marshall‟s sale of the Childe Hassam painting Up 
the Avenue from Thirty-Fourth Street occurred during the time 
period of December 1, 2001 through November 5, 2002.  The 
conviction on this charge carried a mandatory sentence of one 
to three years.  The prosecution‟s theory was “larceny by false 
pretenses.”209  Marshall was found not guilty on this count.  
The remaining grand larceny counts involved two theories: lar-
ceny by embezzlement and larceny by trespassory taking with-
out the owner‟s consent.210  The trespassory taking charge re-
quired proof that Brooke Astor lacked the mental capacity to 
consent.211  The embezzlement theory mandated a finding that 
Marshall was entrusted to hold property on behalf of the own-
er, his mother.  Marshall was convicted on the following counts 
of grand larceny: 
 
 Abuse of the power of attorney to use Mrs. Astor‟s 
funds for his own benefit; 
 Payment of expenses related to the Maine property 
from November 18, 2003 to July 12, 2006; 
 Theft of two paintings owned by Mrs. Astor; 
 Payments to manage his production company; 
 Payments to his employees, including the captain of 
his yacht; 
 Payment for a retroactive increase in his salary; 
 Actions related to the Second and Third Codicils. 
 
Marshall was also convicted of offering a false instrument for 
filing in the first degree, which was the Verified Answer and 
Cross Petition dated September 19, 2006 in the Guardianship 
 
208. Id. at 17177.  Counts two and fifteen were in the first degree (prop-
erty in excess of $1 million), and the others were in the second degree (prop-
erty in excess of $50,000). 
209. Id. at 17180. 
210. Id. at 17182-89. 
211. Id. at 17186. 
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proceeding.  Actions relating to the second and third codicils 
were part of the conspiracy counts on which both Marshall and 
Morrissey were convicted.  The jury also convicted Morrissey of 
forgery in the first degree for forging Mrs. Astor‟s signature on 
the Third Codicil.212 
Although few cases involve property of such value—
approximately $60 million out of a total estate estimated to be 
worth $180 million—the pattern of exploitation was not un-
usual. 
 
C. The Will Contest 
 
Unless there is a settlement, there will be a trial to deter-
mine the validity of Mrs. Astor‟s 2002 will and the three codi-
cils, in Surrogate‟s Court, Westchester County (Mrs. Astor‟s 
county of residence at the time of her death).  Will contests are 
post-death judicial proceedings that determine the validity of a 
person‟s will and, as with the case of Mrs. Astor, codicils to a 
will.213  The most common challenges to a will are based on lack 
of testamentary capacity, fraud, and undue influence.214  The 
standard in a civil proceeding such as a will contest is a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, which can turn on a slight differ-
ence in the persuasiveness of the evidence.  However, problems 
in meeting the burden of proof due to evidentiary obstacles 
(e.g., the testator is deceased and the “dead man‟s” statute pro-
hibits testimony by interested witnesses as to conversations 
and transactions with the decedent)215 are part of the reason it 
is difficult for contestants to succeed in a challenge to a will. 
A will contest can be anticipated if the will excludes a close 
family member, treats family members in the same degree of 
relation differently, or if the will favors a lover, nursing home, 
 
212. See John Eligon, Brooke Astor’s Son Guilty in Scheme to Defraud 
Her, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009 at A1. 
213. Proceedings to “turn over” property wrongfully transferred may also 
be tried as part of an estate administration proceeding.  In New York, a judge 
in a guardianship proceeding no longer has the authority to revoke the will of 
a person.  N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.29(d) (McKinney 2006, Supp. 2010). 
214. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests—An Empirical 
Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607 (1987) (in a study of will contests in 
Tennessee, seventy-four percent alleged incapacity, and seventy-three per-
cent claimed undue influence). 
215. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4519 (McKinney 2007). 
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or recently acquired caretaker or charity, or if changes are 
made to the executed will or codicils that depart from prior 
wills and change the allocation of property.  The likelihood of a 
will contest in any of these scenarios increases if the testator 
was elderly and suffering from some form of dementia, or other 
neurological impairment, around the time the will or codicil 
was executed.  Although a high value is placed on testamentary 
freedom, there is some evidence that judges and juries impose 
their own values of fairness.216  Unless a strong countervailing 
justification exists, this inures to the benefit of the family 
member who is excluded, or receives a lesser amount than un-
der a prior will or than the relative would receive under the 
state‟s intestacy law. 
In the Astor case, an additional factor is the “no contest” 
clause in the 2002 will, which is designed to discourage a chal-
lenge to the will by providing that a contestant who is unsuc-
cessful forfeits property given to the person under the will.217  
This is significant because the 2002 will named numerous char-
ities as beneficiaries.  These charities were adversely affected 
by the changes in the codicils that reduced the bequests Mrs. 
Astor had previously made to them.  This provision, however, 
does not apply to charitable beneficiaries.218 
 
IV. Let‟s Kill All the Lawyers: Professional Norms and          
Betrayal of Clients 
 
Susan I. Robbins, a public interest practitioner appointed 
by the court in the guardianship proceeding, was the only law-
yer who represented Mrs. Astor during her final years that 
upheld the highest values and standards of the profession.  The 
actions of Mrs. Astor‟s other lawyers add another dimension to 
this story, and raise important issues about professional re-
sponsibility, the challenges of representing a person with dimi-
nished capacity, the obligation to provide independent repre-
sentation to a clearly-defined client, and the best practices that 
lawyers should follow to avoid these problems.  Although Mrs. 
 
216. See, e.g., Pamela R. Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the As-
sessment of Testamentary Capacity, 51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 32-33 (2006); Melanie 
B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996). 
217. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS 3-3.5 (McKinney 1998). 
218. See id. 
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Astor‟s estate planning lawyers faced challenges in dealing 
with a client with diminished capacity, it appears that either 
they did not follow the best practices for representation, exer-
cised poor judgment, or compromised the integrity of their re-
presentation due to their relationship with Anthony Marshall.  
This relationship created, at the very least, an appearance of 
impropriety and may have undermined their loyalty to Mrs. 
Astor. 
In sharp contrast to the lawyers who worked “for” Mrs. As-
tor on her will and codicils, Ms. Robbins proved to be an exem-
plar of professional responsibility and high-quality representa-
tion.  In the guardianship proceeding, Ms. Robbins represented 
Mrs. Astor with zeal and undivided loyalty, but also with sensi-
tivity about the complexities of the family relationships.  Ms. 
Robbins had to make sense of the 2002 will and the three codi-
cils that followed and figure out why at age 100 Mrs. Astor 
would fire the law firm with which she had a relationship for 
forty years and dramatically change her estate plan in favor of 
her son.  As a result, she was the most reluctant participant in 
the settlement of the guardianship case just before trial, as it 
failed to revoke the 2002 will and left the determination of the 
validity of the will and its three codicils to a probate proceeding 
after Mrs. Astor‟s death. 
When the report of the handwriting expert stated that 
Mrs. Astor could not have produced the signature on the third 
codicil, Ms. Robbins was faced with an ethical dilemma: her be-
lief that she had an obligation to report that her fellow attor-
ney, Francis X. Morrissey, had possibly committed a criminal 
act by forging the codicil.  She did not, however, want criminal 
charges filed against Anthony Marshall, knowing that would be 
anathema to Mrs. Astor.219  Ms. Robbins ultimately disclosed 
the information to the New York County District Attorney, 
which led to the multiple convictions of Marshall and Morris-
sey, including Morrissey‟s conviction of forging Mrs. Astor‟s 
signature on the third codicil. 
A fundamental problem with the role assumed by the law-
yers retained by, or on behalf of, Mrs. Astor was their involve-
ment with her son Anthony Marshall.  The dominant paradigm 
of the attorney-client relationship is based on a one-to-one rela-
 
219. See GORDON, supra note 4, at 227. 
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tionship in which the attorney is acting zealously on behalf of a 
single client who is seeking to prevail in adversarial litigation.  
A parallel model, however, has long been part of the conception 
of the lawyer‟s role, in which the lawyer serves as an advisor, 
counselor, and problem solver, often with the involvement of 
family members or other interested parties.  During the con-
firmation of Justice Louis Brandeis for the United States Su-
preme Court, Justice Brandeis was subjected to criticism for 
the characterization of his role as a “counsel for the situation” 
in a case that raised questions about the ethics of advising op-
posing parties in a dispute.220 
In the practice of estate planning and elder law, lawyers 
may be asked to represent multiple members of a family, most 
commonly, spouses.221  When a lawyer represents multiple 
clients, or when third parties, such as adult children, are in-
volved with the representation, it is critical for a lawyer to ad-
vise the client and other parties about the parameters of confi-
dentiality and any actual or potential conflicts of interest.  If 
there is a conflict of interest that prevents the attorney from 
representing each client properly, the attorney must withdraw 
from representation.222  If a reasonable attorney would believe 
that the competent and loyal representation of each client 
would not be compromised, and it is not unlawful, the clients 
may make an informed decision to waive the conflict of inter-
est, but must do so in writing.223  If, as in the Astor case, the at-
torneys were formally representing a single client, but had a 
significant relationship with a beneficiary who was deeply in-
volved in the client‟s financial affairs, the appearance that this 
relationship would adversely affect the representation may re-
quire a decision to end the representation. 
With respect to confidentiality, the best practice is to expli-
citly advise clients that no information will be withheld from 
any client, to avoid even the appearance that information ob-
tained from one client may be used in a way that disadvantag-
 
220. See Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as 
People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1502-11 (1996). 
221. See, e.g., Joseph A. Rosenberg, Adapting Unitary Principles of Pro-
fessional Responsibility to Unique Practice Contexts: A Reflective Model for 
Resolving Ethical Dilemmas in Elder Law, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 403 (2000). 
222. N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2009). 
223. Id. R. 1.7(b). 
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es another client.224  This prevents the classic ethical dilemma 
in which one client privately confides in the attorney and dis-
closes information that may be damaging to the interests of the 
other client (for example, a spouse who wants a portion of his 
estate to go to a secret lover).  Without clear guidance from the 
lawyer at the outset of the representation, this poses an unten-
able ethical dilemma: it may require the lawyer to maintain 
the confidential information and risk compromising his ethical 
duty to the “innocent” client; or, the lawyer may withdraw 
without a true explanation, which risks alerting the other 
client of the problem.  Even when a client impliedly consents to 
disclosure of information to a third party, as Mrs. Astor appar-
ently did with her son, it may result in shifting the primary fo-
cus from the client, especially one whose capacity to provide in-
formation is diminished, to the involved third party whose 
interests may not coincide with the intent of the client. 
When a client, who may be an elder, has some degree of 
diminished capacity, the attorney has the obligation to, “as far 
as reasonably possible, maintain a conventional relationship 
with the client.”225  This may be difficult, and often requires 
that the attorney assess the client‟s capacity to enter into an 
attorney-client relationship, and thereafter, engage in the deci-
sions essential to the representation.  In the Astor situation, 
the lawyers involved had to determine whether Mrs. Astor re-
tained sufficient capacity to execute the 2002 will and three co-
dicils to the will.  Although a will requires less capacity to ex-
ecute than any other instrument, this ethical conundrum tests 
the professional judgment of the lawyer.226 
In the Astor case a number of these factors should have 
caused Mrs. Astor‟s lawyers to approach the representation 
with extra caution, to avoid even the appearance of improprie-
 
224. Id. R. 1.6(a). 
225. Id. R. 1.14. 
226. The commentaries of the American College of Trust and Estate 
Counsel on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that a lawyer 
should not prepare a will, trust, or other dispositive instrument for a client 
whom the lawyer reasonable believes does not have the necessary capacity, 
although it is permissible to represent a client with “borderline” capacity.  
AM. COLL. OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL, ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON THE 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 132 (2006), available at 
http://www.actec.org/Documents/misc/ACTEC_Commentaries_4th_02_14_06.
pdf. 
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ty: 
 
 The deep involvement in Mrs. Astor‟s financial af-
fairs by her adult child, albeit an only child, but 
formally employed as his mother‟s money manager 
and armed with a power of attorney; 
 The existing relationships between Mrs. Astor‟s at-
torneys and her son, one that was incidental to, and 
the other that began prior to, and independent of, 
the attorney‟s representation of Mrs. Astor; 
 The substantial degree of incapacity that affected 
Mrs. Astor‟s decision-making; and 
 The significant changes made by the codicils to her 
estate plan, specifically the substantially increased 
amount given to Mrs. Astor‟s son, at the expense of 
charities that had been longstanding objects of Mrs. 
Astor‟s largesse. 
 
The lawyers retained by Mrs. Astor, or on her behalf by 
her son, assumed a number of discrete roles.227  “Mrs. Astor‟s 
attorney” was Henry “Terry” Christensen III, a partner in Sul-
livan & Cromwell, the “white shoe” firm that had a long-term 
relationship with her, beginning when she retained them to de-
fend a challenge to Vincent Astor‟s will by his heirs and ending 
after he drafted and supervised the execution of the “First and 
Final” Codicil.  Mr. Christensen was dismissed by Anthony 
Marshall in February 2004, although he had previously served 
as co-agent with Marshall under a power of attorney and as co-
trustee of the Astor Foundation with Mrs. Astor and Mr. Mar-
shall.228  The “wolf in sheep‟s clothing” was Francis X. Morris-
sey, the enigmatic lawyer who catered to his elderly clients, but 
had trouble escaping the shadow of a prior suspension from 
practice for financial improprieties and was involved in a num-
ber of cases in which he was named as beneficiary in his 
clients‟ wills.229  The “hired gun” was G. Warren Whitaker, a 
 
227. I have assigned these roles descriptive names in order to highlight 
the nature of each lawyer‟s involvement. 
228. See Kovaleski & McIntire, supra note 196.  See also GORDON, supra 
note 4, at 160. 
229. See Serge F. Kovaleski & Colin Moynihan, Many Clients of Astor 
Lawyer Left Him Bequests in Their Wills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2008, at B1. 
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top trusts and estates attorney retained by Anthony Marshall, 
after he fired Mr. Christensen, to draft the second and third 
codicils that proved so controversial, and who on the surface 
seemed thorough and professional, but who also appeared 
tainted by his willingness to follow the directions of Marshall 
and Morrissey at the expense of Mrs. Astor.230 
Mrs. Astor‟s lawyer provided the initial and prophetic 
warning by giving the first codicil the unusual title of First and 
Final Codicil for reasons he never stated explicitly.  Perhaps, as 
Meryl Gordon suggests, it was to make a statement to all those 
who came after him that he was finished stretching Mrs. As-
tor‟s capacity beyond its limits in executing testamentary doc-
uments.  It may be that Mrs. Astor‟s lawyer compromised his 
professional judgment, or merely was representing his client 
zealously by following the legal presumption of capacity, and 
acting with the knowledge that it takes less capacity to make a 
will than any other document.  That often very difficult judg-
ment is the lawyer‟s to make.231  It is possible that if Mrs. As-
tor‟s lawyer refused to go through with the creation and execu-
tion of the First and Final codicil based on his assessment that 
she lacked testamentary capacity, there would not have been 
any subsequent efforts to modify her 2002 will.  Instead, Mrs. 
Astor‟s lawyer supervised the execution of the First and Final 
Codicil.  When Anthony Marshall fired him, he continued to 
practice at his law firm, and he emerged later as a key witness 
for the prosecution in the criminal trial. 
The wolf in sheep‟s clothing stepped into the gap left by the 
departure of Mrs. Astor‟s attorney.  He was given the opportu-
nity to flatter, dine, comfort, and accompany her, without re-
vealing the true nature of his checkered professional past.  The 
wolf in sheep‟s clothing appeared to not only represent the in-
terests of Mr. Marshall, rather than Mrs. Astor, but partici-
pated in a course of action with Mr. Marshall that culminated 
in convictions for scheming to defraud Mrs. Astor and forging 
her signature on the third codicil.  The wolf in sheep‟s clothing 
 
230. Mr. Whitaker was not charged in the criminal case, although he 
was called as a witness by the prosecution, and testified that she was lucid 
when she signed the codicil drafted by Mr. Whitaker for which he also served 
as a witness.  John Eligon & A. G. Sulzberger, In Closing, Defense Focuses on 
Changes to Astor Will and 2 Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2009, at A29. 
231. See AM. COLL. OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL, supra note 226. 
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did not follow the professional norm that requires an attorney 
to resolve any appearances of impropriety so that conflicts are 
avoided.232  When he realized that the proposed changes to the 
codicils were benefiting the son, and that he, the wolf, was 
going to be named executor of an estate that would have 
brought substantial commissions, he should have stepped 
away.  He should have urged Mrs. Astor‟s son to find another 
attorney with whom he would not be involved, and who would 
not benefit even by being named as a fiduciary.233  Instead, the 
wolf in sheep‟s clothing presided over the execution of the 
second and third codicils, and he was convicted of forging Mrs. 
Astor‟s signature on the third codicil—an action clearly beyond 
the pale of professional conduct. 
The hired gun, Whitaker, entered the fray for the second 
codicil, and all the lessons learned in practice at a prestigious 
firm, and experience garnered with clients of great wealth and 
impeccable pedigree, could not overcome a fundamental mis-
step: he prepared the second (and third) codicils based on the 
instructions of Anthony Marshall, as conveyed by Francis X. 
Morrissey, the wolf in sheep‟s clothing.  He never met privately 
with Mrs. Astor prior to the execution of the second codicil to 
confirm that she had the intent and capacity to execute the co-
dicil and make substantial changes to her estate plan.  In the 
subsequent criminal trial in which the hired gun testified, his 
meticulous (and multiple) memoranda to the file234 were impor-
tant, albeit contentious, pieces of evidence.  The prosecution 
sought to undermine the hired gun‟s credibility by highlighting 
 
232. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009). 
233. It is not improper for an attorney to be named as the executor in a 
client‟s will, provided the client consents after being fully informed of all rele-
vant information.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (1983); 
AM. COLL. OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL, supra note 226, at 95.  See also Law-
yer Disciplinary Bd. v. Ball, 633 S.E.2d 241 (W. Va. 2006) (lawyer who col-
lected $1.6 million in executor‟s fees under will he drafted disbarred).  In New 
York, a lawyer named as executor in a will must disclose, and obtain a signed 
written acknowledgment of disclosure, that the lawyer is entitled to both fi-
duciary commissions and attorney‟s fees; otherwise the commissions will be 
reduced by one-half.  N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 2307-a (McKinney 2007). 
234. This is a recommended practice for attorneys supervising the execu-
tion of a will or codicil, especially for a person with diminished capacity and a 
contest is anticipated.  The purpose of this practice is to preserve evidence of 
the client‟s capacity and the process leading up to, and including, the execu-
tion of the will or other dispositive instrument.  See AM. COLL. OF TRUST & 
ESTATE COUNSEL, supra note 226, at 132. 
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the inconsistent details in the memoranda he drafted after 
witnessing the execution of the second codicil.235  These memo-
randa, in describing the execution ceremony, may have also 
been self-serving in that it appeared they were carefully crafted 
to support a finding that Mrs. Astor had the requisite testa-
mentary capacity, when in fact there was considerable evidence 
to the contrary. 
The Astor case is a cautionary tale for lawyers working 
with clients with diminished capacity, particularly under cir-
cumstances in which family members or caretakers who stand 
to benefit from an estate plan communicate and meet with the 
lawyer.  Perhaps the primary lessons to learn are to clearly 
understand who the client actually is, to avoid the appearance 
of impropriety, and to recognize when it may not be appropri-
ate to continue representing a person, either because of divided 
loyalties, lack of capacity, or the presence of undue influence.  
When the borderline between capacity and incapacity is murky, 
as it often is, a close relationship with the client and thoughtful 
professional judgment are critical.  Of course, in the case of 
Francis Morrissey, an additional lesson goes without saying: do 
not commit a blatant, unjustifiable, and illegal act such as for-
gery. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The public and private worlds of Brooke Astor collided in 
the twilight of her life, in the waning light of her awareness 
and capacity.  At 105 years of age, Mrs. Astor lived a full and, 
in her own words, “wonderful” life.  A life defined almost exclu-
sively by excessive wealth, privilege, and comfort, was also 
complex.  Mrs. Astor endured severe domestic violence in her 
first marriage, went on to defy the doubts of many to revitalize 
the Astor Foundation and give generously, and in her final 
years, endured financial exploitation and personal neglect. 
Meryl Gordon captures the nuanced humanity of Brooke 
Astor, although more discussion of the broader socio-economic 
context would have better illuminated the important issues of 
elder abuse and neglect.  For New York elders without the fi-
 
235. John Eligion, Prosecution Finally Rests in Astor Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 19, 2009, at A21. 
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nancial resources of Brooke Astor, the consequences of abuse 
and financial exploitation are severe, life threatening, and re-
sult in harsh material deprivation.  The scope, quality, and ac-
cessibility of support services available to Brooke Astor 
dwarfed those generally available to people in New York, par-
ticularly those who depend on public funding.  Access to suffi-
cient services and resources is essential in order to enforce the 
right to live in the community,236 reverse patterns of unneces-
sary and preventable institutionalization of elders,237 prevent 
and remedy abuse and financial exploitation of elders, and lim-
it the use of guardianships as a substitute for necessary sup-
port services and other less restrictive alternatives. 
The stories of these “other” elderly are equally, if not more, 
compelling than Mrs. Astor‟s story, even in the absence of the 
lure of wealth, fame, and celebrity.  When these stories attract 
the same attention from media, social and legal institutions, 
the world will have changed significantly, and for the better. 
 
236. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (re-
cognizing right to treatment and services in the community for people with 
disabilities if reasonable). 
237. See, e.g., John Leland, Helping Aged Leave Nursing Homes for a 
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2009, at A10 (describing efforts in Philadelphia 
to relocate nursing home residents back into the community through the 
“Money Follows the Person” program). 
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